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ABSTRACT
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by
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Master of Science in Civil Engineering
This thesis presents an analysis of alternative design and main-
tenance strategies for the recently completed Dar-es-Salaam--Moro-oro
section of the Tanzania-Zambia Highway. The analysis is undertaken
using an analytic model--the Hiqhway Cost Model--which estimates con-
struction, maintenance and road user costs as a function of the
initial design standards, level of maintenance, and traffic volume
and loading. The road, which is showing signs of early failure, is
evaluated from two perspectives--a review of the design assumptions
which were made prior to construction; and a review of the alterna-
tives which are available to the Tanzanian government now that the
road has been completed. Specific issues which are addressed in-
clude the adequacy of the original design, the possible effects in
traffic, and the effects of applying a low standard of maintenance.
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1 . INTRODUCTION
The development of a transport sector is very often regarded to
be of significant importance particularly for the process of economic
development of a country. However, the importance of transport in-
frastructure and its position in relation to other sectors for the
process of economic development is not exactly clear among theoreti-
cians and practical planners. Often investment in transport facility
has been cited as a prerequisite--but not necessarily a quaranteee--of
economic development.(1) There is, therefore, a deep controversy
whether an extensive infrastructural base should be provided prior to
all other development activities or whether a sufficient infra-
structure will quasi-automatically be formed as a result of market
forces of a growing economy.
In the absence of efficient infrastructure, any investor will
exclusively base his decisions in regard to the location of economic
activities on existing natural factors and resources. This eventually
leads to undesired regional imbalances that today one must try to
correct by various measures of regional and structural policies, in-
cluding, well planned transportation infra-structure that creates new
artificial locational conditions. This is particularly true of most
less developed countries where a dualistic development with insuf-
ficient interior integration is a common characteristic.
Any counter-balancing of the disintegrating tendencies of this
dualistic development, from an overall welfare-economic point of
view, can only be achieved by systematic promotion of integration
through various infra-structural measures. To counteract these
clearly perceptible tendencies, infra-structure cannot, therefore,
be left to the market forces; otherwise economic, social and politi-
cal contrasts within these countries will only increase still further.
Hence, infra-structural planning must necessarily be done by the
public sector.
While there is no doubt that in almost all less developed
countries there is still a great deficiency of infra-structural fac-
ilities, this fact alone cannot, however, render them absolute
priority. The need for an expansion of directly productive act-
ivities is often larger. The undue over-emphasis that is often
attributed to investments in infra-structure is largely the result
of lack of clear evaluation criteria and, above all, lack of recog-
nition of losses and sanctions, and the non-existent or insufficient
evaluation of losses by way of investments foregone in other sec-
tors.(2)
The percentage of public development budget that should be de-
voted in infra-structural investments depends largely upon the degree
of activities of private enterpreneurs in the directly-productive
sectors of the economy. If there is a large private initiative in
these sectors, a relatively high share of the public budget can be
used for infra-structure, whereas if there is lack of private part-
icipation and the government has to undertake activities also in
this field, then the relative share of infra-structure with respect
to total expenditure has to be lower.(3)
The allocation of available resources among competing alterna-
tives is a complex process, generally precipitating in an overall
national development program. In a mixed economy, the hard core of
development program is a program of public expenditures. No matter
how decisions actually get made, the outcome of public expenditure
decision-making indicates that each of the following has been de-
cided(4):
i) the total level of public expenditure;
ii) the relative sizes of the major programs of public
expenditures, such as, defense, health, education,
transportation;
iii) the set of specific projects which will constitute a
program, hence also the rejection or postponement of
other projects;
iv) the designs of accepted projects which are to be im-
plemented, hence the rejection or postponement of al-
ternative designs.
Many different choice procedures might be applied and a variety of
theoretical models exist that serve to represent the process, or to
predict the outcome.
The procedures and techniques used to arrive at the first two
decisions, mentioned above, are a subject of broader issues under-
lying national development planning and budgeting that are con-
sidered beyond the scope of the present thesis.
While the concepts of project evaluation are fairly well
understood and techniques for their application well developed, the
outcome of any one particular project evaluation is highly dependent
upon, and often, sensitive to the degree of accuracy and oversimplif-
ications involved in modelling the various costs and benefits assoc-
iated with the project. Secondly, the degree of efficiency with
which resources are allocated for consumption within a single pro-
ject depends upon the number of alternative designs evaluated for
that particular project.
In a road construction project evaluation,the key variables
are the time stream of construction, maintenance and vehicle operat-
ing costs. While it may be practically impossible to consider all
possible design alternatives together with varying combinations of
maintenance policies, it is not uncommon to see feasibility studies
that evaluate a single design alternative based upon simplified
assumptions of maintenance and vehicle operating costs. However,
the reason for such simplified approaches is, in part, due to the
lack of information available that governs the relationship among
road design, deterioration, maintenance policy and vehicle operat-
ing costs and, in part, due to budgetary constraints at the feas-
ibility level. The need to rationally analyse the economic con-
sequences of alternative design, construction and maintenance poli-
cies for roads, mainly in developing countries,resulted in the initial
development of the Highway Cost Model (HCM) at M.I.T. in 1969. The
approach differed from the then current practice in that it in-
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cluded realistic models of road deterioration and related these to
the costs and benefits of a road, and to specific policy alterna-
tives available to the decision maker. Relationships between design
standards, surface conditions and road user costs were established
subsequently through extensive field studies in Kenya conducted by
the Transportation Road Research Laboratory (UK) in conjunction with
the World Bank.
The advantage of using a simulation model during project
evaluation is two-fold. One, the model permits a quick and accurate
estimation of the time stream of construction, maintenance and
vehicle operating costs for a particular design standard and mainten-
ance policy, and second, it enables the user to consider simultan-
eously a combination of different design and maintenance standards
to arrive at a least-total-cost solution.
The current thesis is a result of the application of the HCM
in a case study of the Dar-es-Salaam--Morogoro section of the Tan-
zania-Zambia Highway, developed during a program for tansportation
planning in developing countries sponsored by the U.S. Agency for
International Development. Before going any further into the objec-
tives of the case study it is worthwhile to look at the Transporta-
tion Planning scenario in Tanzania and to summarize the analytic
framework of the HCM.
1.1 Transportation Planning in Tanzania
Tanzania has an area of 361,000 square miles and in 1970 its
population was 12.9 million growing annually at a rate of about 2.2
percent. In the same year, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) amounted
to roughly 1,170 million US dollars and consequently GDP per capita
of 91 US dollars. The average annual growth rate of GDP, in real
terms, between 1964 and 1970 was 5.6 percent. The regional distribu-
tion of GDP is, of course, uneven, with the greater shares concen-
trated around few urban centers. Agriculture is the foundation of
the economic structure, and in 1970, 40 percent of the GDP originated
from the agricultural sector and about 70-75 percent of the total
export value came also from agricultural products. The rest of the
GDP is contributed through mining, manufacturing and handicraft,
and commerce, services and tourism.(5)
The basic transport system in Tanzania consists of three ocean
ports, about 1600 miles of railways (not including the Tanzania-
Zambia railway still under construction), about 2200 miles of main
and district roads, 1060 miles of an 8-inch pipeline, 20 regularly
served airports and some coastal and inland shipping services. Plann-
ing, design, construction and maintenance. of the country's main
roads come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Communications
and Transport (Commworks). In 1970, the road network under the juris-
diction of Commworks consisted of 1388 miles of bitumen roads, 692
miles of engineered gravel roads and 8410 miles of earth roads (6)
Traditionally, Commworks has been largely orientated in a
purely technical direction. The planning of the road system was done
more according to technical rather than politico-economic considera-
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tions. It was only in 1967 that Commworks had its first planning
unit, and, although this unit works frequently in conjunction with
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, there is
still much left to be desired by way of economic evaluation of in-
dividual projects and their consistency with the overall national
planning.
At the moment, the feasibility study, with its all important
benefit/cost ratio, is the core of transport planning in Tanzania.
The planning process is essentially project planning, with the feas-
ibility study playing the vital and obvious role. The present stages
of planning may be summarized as follows (7):
1) Project identification--by regional or central government
bodies.
2) Preliminary project appraisal.
3) Project feasibility study--usually carried out by foreign
consultants.
4) Engineering design.
5) Application for finance, often from foreign donors such
as the World Bank.
Although this kind of planning procedure has only been introduced
in recent years, it is a great advancement on previous practices.
Nevertheless, there is a danger that one might see this as the ul-
timate aim of transport endeavors in Tanzania. The feasibility study
is essentially a tool of project by project planning, and serious
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doubts are now being raised as to the validity of this approach to
the planning of public investments. In its most simple form, the
project approach can lead to a piecemeal investment program, each
project being viewed as a separate entity with little regard to the
impact of total investment. The new planning methods now being de-
veloped attempt to view the choice of one project over the other in
the context of their total national impact, where the total impact
is evaluated in terms of a consistent and appropriate set of objec-
tives(8)
Apart from this lack of coherency with the overall national
objectives, the feasibility studies also suffer from lack of uniform
methodology that makes comparison and ranking of different road pro-
l-- jects a difficult task. The application of discounted benefit-cost
or present worth analysis in recent studies serves to reduce this
problem of uniform methodology to some extent, but differences among
studies conducted by different groups still exist that stem from dif-
ferences in the basic assumptions underlying such factors as the
likely range of benefits, choice of appropriate rates for discount-
ing, vehicle operating costs and their relationship with surface
type and road condition, maintenance and its interaction with traffic,
road design and user costs, etc. As long as feasibility studies
are conducted by different groups free to employ their own method-
ologies and assumptions, such differences will continue to exist,
unless the planning unit within the Ministry of Commworks stipulates
its own set of assumptions and a standardized methodology which
will dictate the framework within which projects must be evaluated.
As new methods become available, and computational tasks are
made easier through the use of computers, more can be achieved at the
feasibility level than is currently true. This is specifically so in
terms of integrating maintenance into the highway design process where
the costs and effects of maintenance are evaluated simultaneously
with predictions of construction and road user costs, to estimate the
total cost required to provide the highway facility 9 . Reduced com-
putational effort through the use of computer techniques also make it
possible to evaluate a larger number of alternatives at the feas-
ibility level, so that, by review of the mutli-solution output, one
can examine more potential trade-offs and even come closer to finding
the optimum investment solution given the decision variables and con-
straints defining the problem. These are the essential features of
the Highway Cost Model used in the present case studying of the Dar-
es-Salaam--Morogoro Road. With the help of the model, it was possible
to analyze the effects of varying levels of traffic and different
maintenance policies on different pavement design alternatives, and
hence to identify the least-total-cost solutions. It was found that
considerable savings in terms of reduced maintenance and vehicle op-
erating costs could have been made had the road been initially con-
structed to a higher standard, requiring only minimal maintenance ef-
fort during the rest of its design life. The Model was also used to
analyze the effects of traffic overloading and to evaluate different
maintenance policy options that could be persued given the present
condition of the road and the likely effects of traffic.
1.2 Summary of the Highway Cost Model--Analytic Framework*
The basic function of the Highway Cost Model is to estimate
construction, maintenance, and user costs for a road which has been
designed and maintained to specific standards. This is done by sim-
ulating the life of the road from initial construction through
periodic upgrading, and the yearly cycle of use, deterioration and
maintenance.
The simulation of the life of the road is accomplished by es-
timating construction and maintenance activities, road conditions,
traffic volumes, and all associated costs on a year by year basis
through the analysis period. The specific operations undertaken in
each year are as follows:
A construction submodel schedules projects, estimates construc-
tion quantities and costs, allocates a percentage of these costs to
the current year, and updates the status of the road's segments as
projects are completed.
A preliminary estimate of the current year's traffic is made
based on the previous year's traffic and anticipated growth.
The road deterioration and maintenance submodel estimates av-
erage road surface conditions for the year as a function of the
initial design standard, traffic volume and composition, age of the
road, environment and the specified maintenance policy. Surface
In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, detailed descriptions of
the functional form of the various routines and submodels of the
Highway Cost Model are omitted from the present thesis. However,
where necessary, the reader is referred to particular sections of
the HCM text for details. ("The Highway Cost Model: General Frame-
work", M.I.T., June 1975).
deterioration is estimated for unpaved and paved roads using empiri-
cal relations developed by the Transportation and Road Research Lab-
oratory in Kenya (gravel roads and bituminous treated roads on
cement stabilized base) and results from the AASHO road tests (as-
phalt concrete roads on granular bases).
Maintenance activity may be specified for each surface type
on either a scheduled or demand responsive basis, and are priced
according to the maintenance actually performed. The condition of
the road is expressed in terms of roughness, rut depth, cracking and
patching (all roads) and looseness and moisture content (unpaved
roads).
The user cost submodel estimates the costs of operating vehicles
over the road as a function of surface type and condition, and de-
sign geometries (grade, horizontal curvature and road width). The
components of vehicle operating costs include both running costs
(fuel, oil, tires, maintenance parts and labor) and time costs (de-
preciation,financing, wages, overhead, and time value of cargo). Es-
timates are based primarily on the results of the TRRL study in Kenya,
and are generally applicable to free flowing traffic conditions on
two lane roads.
The results of the simulation include a record of expenditures
incurred by road users; and a detailed history of the status and
deterioration of the road. Construction and maintenance costs are
broken down into labor, equipment, material, overhead and profit
components by line item. Vehicle operating costs are estimated for
i8
each type of vehicle using the road.
All estimates are made in terms of physical quantities, from
which costs are obtained by applying the appropriate unit rates.
The model can, therefore, be used within any monetary system, and
is not affected by changes in relative prices.
The model estimates costs both in financial and economic terms.
Financial costs represent actual monetary expenditures for vehicle
operations, and for road construction, and maintenance activities.
Economic costs represent the costs to the economy in terms of the
resources consumed. In most cases taxes, duties, subsidies and
other government transfer payments do not constitute a real social
cost, so the economic costs of resources must be expressed net
of all such transfer payments.
1.3 Objective and Scope of Thesis
This thesis is presented as a case-study demonstrating the
application of the Highway Cost Model (HCM) as a tool for evaluat-
ing alternative design and maintenance standards on a selected road
project in Tanzania. The project selected is the Dar-es-Salaam--
Morogoro section of the Tanzania-Zambia Highway (Tan-Zam Highway).
This particular project was selected for two reasons. One, because
it gave the opportunity of evaluating a large number of alternatives
in terms of several pavement designs and maintenance policies for
each of four different possible cases of traffic projections that
were analyzed by an earlier study of the Tan-Zam Highway. Second,
the newly constructed road has shown signs of an early failure on
several sections. Using the HCM,it was possible to evaluate several
post construction investment strategies in terms of different main-
tenance policies, taking into account the effects of possible over-
loading of medium and heavy truck traffic, so that recommendations
could be made for an optimum maintenance policy.
The application of the HighwayCost Model is presented in three
distinct experiments. In each case the Model is used primarily to
generate the time stream of construction, maintenance and vehicle
operating costs during a specified analysis period for specific pave-
ment designs and maintenance policies.
First, the Highway Cost Model is used to evaluate the pavement
design and maintenance policy proposed for the case-study section by
an earlier study. The total construction, maintenance and vehicle
operating costs computed by the model are analyzed and discussed in
comparison with those of the study.
Second, the model is used in a feasibility level experiment to
evaluate a wider range of alternative strategies. The strategies
are defined as combinations of different pavement designs and main-
tenance policies, under four different cases of traffic projections.
The least cost alternative (sum of the present values of construc-
tion, maintenance and vehicle operating costs) is identified for
each case of traffic projection, followed by a discussion of trade-
offs between maintenance and vehicle operating costs, pavement
deterioration characteristics, and the advantages of constructing a
stronger pavement initially.
Third, the Highway Cost Model is used in a post construction
investment tradeoff experiment to develop recommendations for an
optimum maintenance strategy for the newly built road. Three main-
tenance policies are evaluated assuming first,no overloading of
traffic, and second, a 30% overload on all medium and heavy truck
traffic. The analysis includes a discussion of the tradeoffs be-
tween maintenance expenditure and user savings, and a possible early
reconstruction of the newly built road.
1.4 Data Problems
Given the time and resource constraints of the present research,
it was not possible to gather first hand data from Tanzania. Resort
was, therefore, made to whatever data was available from various
feasibility and engineering studies performed on other road related
projects in Tanzania. Inevitably there were historical inconsis-
tencies among different studies, and in some cases, data was not
available at the level of detail required by the HCM. Maximum use
was made of whatever data was available and engineering judgments
made where necessary.
In reviewing the comparative results presented in this thesis
one, therefore, must be cognizant of these shortcomings, and the dif-
ferences observed should not be extrapolated.
1.5 Thesis Layout
The rest of the thesis is divided into three sections. SEC-
TION 2 gives a statement of the problem describing the case-study
project and the analysis and recommendations of earlier feasibility
and engineering design studies. SECTION 3 contains the results
and analysis of the three experiments in the application of the HCM.
SECTION 4 contains a summary of major conclusions. A detailed doc-
umentation of the Data inputs to the HCM not included in the body
of the text is attached in Appendix A.
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2. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT
2.1 Choice of Project for the Case Study
The project selected for the present case study is the Dar-es-
Salaam--Morogoro section of the Tanzania--Zambia (Tan-Zam) High-
way, shown circled in FIGURE 1. The 1920 km Tan-Zam Highway con-
nects Ndola, the center of Zambia's copper belt, with Dar-es-Salaam,
the chief port of Tanzania. Large sections of the highway, in-
cluding the Dar-es-Salaam--Morogoro section, required upgrading
and realignment in order to provide an all-weather road that would
handle both present and projected traffic through the two coun-
tries. The highway became more important after the United Nations
imposed am embargo on traffic with Rhodesia, an act which led Zambia
to seek alternate routes for its sea-going import-export traffic.
The old road between Dar-es-Salaam and Morogoro was a two
lane bituminous surface treated road 192.9 kms long and built in
the mid-fifties. The road was 8.5 m (28 ft) wide with a pave-
ment 6.1 m (20 ft) wide, and some very winding, undulating sec-
tions. The pavement was in poor condition (PSI below 2.5) due to
heavy traffic and lack of adequate maintenance.
In 1966, Stanford Research Institute (SRI), under a contract
financed by USAID, conducted a feasibility study of the entire
Tan-Zam Highway. On the Dar-es-Salaam--Morogoro section, SRI pro-
posed to replace the old road with an asphalt concrete road along
a new alignment that would shorten the total length by 8.3 kms.
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Subsequent to the SRI study, final engineering designs were pre-
pared by DeLeuw Cather International, Inc. (DCI). The construction,
financed by USAID and constructed by Nello L. Teer, started in
1970 and was completed in 1973.
2.2 The SRI Study of the Tan-Zam Highway and Recommendations for
Dar-Morogoro Section
The primary objective of the SRI study was "the determination
of the optimum route, engineering features, and costs of a highway
link between Zambia and Tanzania, and the appraisal of the economic
development potential made possible by the construction of the high-
way and appropriate feeder roads." SRI evaluated four alterna-
tive routes through Tanzania using four possible cases of traffic
loading. The four alternative routes considered by SRI are also
shown in FIGURE 1. The four traffic loading cases were:
Case 1. Present and projected traffic assuming normal
growth but no copper or developmental traffic.
Case 2. Case 1 plus developmental traffic due to comple-
mentary investments in development schemes along
the highway.
Case 3. Case 2 plus transportation of Zambian copper in
excess of the 1966 level of production.
Case 4. Case 2 plus transportation of all Zambian copper.
The period of analysis used by SRI was 13 years, from 1967 to
1980. The average daily traffic projections by vehicle type and
Amb.';
TABLE 1. TRAFFIC VOLUMES BY VEHICLE TYPE (ADT)
VEHICLE
TYPE
LOADING
CONDITION
Lase 1
1967
1980
Nnnual
Srowth Rate %
ýase 2
1967
1980
.nnual
3rowth Rate %
:ase 3
1967
1980
knnual
irowth Rate %
:ase 4
1967
1980
knnual
;rowth Rate %
CARS
79
239
8.9
79
239
8.9
79
239
8.9
79
239
8.9
.
BUSES
22
54
7.2
22
54
7.2
22
54
7.2
22
54
7.2
7TON
TRUCK
58
98
4.1
60
101
4.1
60
101
4.1
60
101
4.1
10 TON
TRUCK
39
66
4.1
40
91
6.5
40
91
6.5
40
91
6.5
22 TON
TRUCK
13
22
4.1
14
32
6.5
14
32.
6.5
14
32
6.5
22 TON
COPPER TRUCKS
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
100
21.4
200
300
3.2
their annual growth rates for each of the four loading cases are
summarized in TABLE I. Copper traffic is included in a separate
category of 22 ton copper trucks to facilitate the application of
different growth rates.
SRI concluded that for Traffic Cases 1 and 2, Route 1 was
economically superior; for Case 4, Routes 1 and 3 were equally des-
irable. For Traffic Case 3, however, SRI concluded that transporta-
tion of the expected growth in copper production was not economically
favorable over any of the routes considered. The reason given was
that the large outlay required for added highway construction and
maintenance costs to handle the limited addition of heavy copper
trucks more than offset any savings in vehicle operating costs due
to shipping the growth copper over the Tan-Zam Highway rather than
by rail through Rhodesia and other neighboring countries.
Routes 1 and 3 were divided into a total of 13 segments and
the highway requirements,in terms of pavement design and maintenance
costs, of each segment under each case of traffic loading identified.
Segment 13, the section between Dar-es-Salaam and Morogoro, was
common to both routes.
For segment 13, SRI's recommendation was a new asphalt con-
crete road to replace the existing double bituminous surface treated
road along a new alignment.
2.2.1. ALIGNMENT
The old road was 192.9 kilometers. On the new road, the first
10 kilometers from Dar-es-Salaam follows the same alignment due to
the concentration of urban activity along the right of way. For
the balance of the new route, only 3.4 kms follows the old alignment.
The total length of the new route is 184.6 kms providing not only
an 8.3 km distance savings, but a higher standard of geometric
and safety design.
2.2.2. PAVEMENT DESIGN
SRI recommended an asphalt concrete pavement design with the
following materials and thicknesses:
asphalt concrete surface - 5.08 cms (2 ins)
crushed stone base - 15.24 (6 ins)
gravel sub-base - 12.7 cms (5 ins)
The above thicknesses were proposed for the Traffic Case 4
but the design was not based on any site investigations, Hence, no
compensation was made for the different subgrade strengths along
the new alignments, A typical section of the SRI pavement design
is shown in FIGURE 2.
2.2.3. MAINTENANCE POLICIES
SRI derived the following equations for computation of
annual maintenance expenditure on bituminous surface treated (DBST)
roads (20 ft wide) and asphalt concrete (AC) roads (24 ft wide) as a
function of average daily traffic (ADT):
DBST MAINTENANCE = 2750 + 1.44 (ADT) shs/km*
AC MAINTENANCE = 8000 + 0.16 (ADT) shs/km
Approximately 7 Tanzanian Shillings (shs) = $1 US at the
time of the study.
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TYPICAL SECTION - SRI DESIGN
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Although no specific maintenance activities were given
for the old (DBST) road, major activities on the new (AC) road
were specified as follows:
shoulder grading - 4 bladings per year
culvert/ditch clearing - 2 times per year
seal coat - once every five years
major overlay - once every 15 years
Because an overlay was specified for once in 15 years,
none was included in the present analysis which extended only
13 years, including construction in the first 3 years.
2.2.4. VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS
The unit vehicle operating costs used by SRI on DBST
surfaced roads in Tanzania are summarized in TABLE 2. On the
new alignment, SRI implied an average reduction of 20% in vehicle
operating costs. The vehicle operating costs used by SRI did
not include vehicle finance, insurance, administration, or
cargo finance costs. Detailed derivation of the unit costs
was not given in their report.
Me
Fuel
Oil
Maintenance
Tires
Wages
Deprecia-
tion
Total
Veh. Speed
(Km/hr)
TABLE 2
UNIT VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS (SRI)
(Shs/Veh/Km)
d Car Bus 7 Ton Truck 10 Ton T
055 .160 .079 .153
004 .020 .011 .018
043 .126 .101 .261
027 .055 .044 .100
-- .101 .258 .275
.138
.267
.206
.668
.103
.596
.204
1.011
80 72
ruck 22 Ton Truck
.216
.031
.372
.138
.275
.250
1 .282
72
2.2.5. COST SUMMARY
The construction period was specified as 3 years, from 1967
to 1970, and the analysis made for a total of 13 years, 1967 to
1980.
A summary of the construction costs estimated by SRI is
presented in TABLE 3, while the Present Value of Total Maintenance
and Vehicle Operating Costs, using the maintenance equations and
vehicle operating costs specified by SRI and a discount rate of 10%,
is presented in TABLE 4,
TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS (SRI)
(Thousands of Tanzania Shillings)
Excavation Plus Clearing 6,132
Pavement 33,500
Drainage 9,438
Total 49,070
TABLE 4
PRESENT VALUE OF MAINTENANCE AND VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS (SRI)
(Thousands of Tanzania Shillings)
Maintenance Vehicle Operating
Old Road 26,009 247,300
New Road 16,100 206,548
2.3. DeLeuw Cather Pavement Designs
Subsequent to the SRI study, DeLeuw Cather International,
Inc. (DCI) was retained by USAID to make a final engineering and de-
sign study of the Dar-es-Salaam--Morogoro segment. DCI used more
current and updated information on existing traffic and growth pat-
terns, and recommended, at first, as asphalt concrete paved surface
with a trench type section for base-course and sub-base. The typical
section is shown in FIGURE 3. From difficulties encountered in
the earlier stages of construction, it became apparent that this
6'-011
FIGURE 3
TYPICAL SECTION - DCI TRENCH DESIGN
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design was not adequate to meet the conditions encountered. The
major factor involved was the poor drainaqe characteristic of the
trench section.
The design was subsequently modified by DCI with an exten-
sion of the base and sub-base across the entire cross-section, as
shown in FIGURE 4. The pavement was designed for a total of 675,000
applications of an 18 kip equivalent axle load and the thicknesses
recommended were 3.8 cms (1.5 ins) of asphalt concrete over 10 cm
(4 ins) of crushed stone (or 8.9 cms (3.5 ins) of sand asphalt) base
over 10.2 cms (4 ins) of gravel sub-base on top of select soil of
variable thickness depending upon the CBR value of the underlying
subgrade. At the contractor's option, the first half of the road
from Dar-es-Salaam was built with a sand asphalt base while the
rest was built with crushed stone.
In the analysis of this pavement with the Highway Cost Model,
the material for the select soil subbase was taken to be the same as
4 ins, crushed gravel subbase. The total subbase thicknesses were,
therefore, specified as follows:
Average Subgrade (CBR(%) Sub-base Thickness
7 36.8 cms (14.5 ins)
8 25.4 cms (10 ins)
10 21.6 cms (8.5 ins)
30 no sub-base
The traffic projections used by DCI are given in TABLE 5.
TABLE 5. TRAFFIC PROJECTIONS USED BY DCI (ADT)
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*DCI assumed an impulse jump of 12.5% in 1971 when the new road
was expected to open, and a shift of 14.5% of the medium (7 Ton and
10 Ton) and 35.5% of the heavy (22 Ton) truck traffic to the Tan-Zam
Railroad scheduled to open in 1979.
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3. DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENTS WITH THE HIGHWAY COST
MODEL
3.1 Evaluation of the SRI Proposal on Dar-es-Salaam--Morogoro Seg-
ment
The HCM was used to compute construction, maintenance and
vehicle operating costs on the old and new roads using the SRI pave-
ment design, alignment characteristics, and maintenance policy, and
Traffic Case 4. The results obtained with the model are analyzed
and discussed in comparison with the SRI results.
3.1.1. INPUTS TO THE HIGHWAY COST MODEL
Since the Dar-Morogoro Segment was only a small part of the
entire Tan-Zam feasibility study, the SRI report lacked data at the
level of detail required by the HCM. Where necessary the additional
data were obtained from other similar studies conducted in Tanzania.
In particular, this applied to the design and operating character-
istics of the 5 vehicle types, maintenance practice and unit costs on
the existing road, CBR values of the underlying subgrades, and the
pavement design, age and condition of the old road.
A complete bibliography of the data sources used for this case
study is included in the reference list at the end, while a detailed
documentation of the inputs to the HCM is provided in Appendix A.
A brief description of the various input categories is outlined be-
low.
Segment Description and Alignment Characteristics:
The old road was divided into four segments: two segments,
totaling 179.5 kms, that were to be realigned; one segment, 3.4 kms.
long, to be reconstructed along the existing alignment; and a final
segment, 10 km. long, that remained unchanged, as specified by SRI.
The new road was divided into seven segments reflecting
primarily changes in the subgrade CBR.values. All segments were
coded and described by their lengths, average curvature, subgrade
CBR values, average rise and fall, and intensity of rainfall. (See
FIGURE A-I and TABLES A-la and A-lb in Appendix A). The number of
25 foot contour lines crossed per kilometer was also input for all
segments along new alignments, for computation of earthwork quanti-
ties.
Road Cross-Section and Pavement Desion:
The cross-section and pavement designs for the new road in-
put to the Highway Cost Model were as specified by SRI. TABLE A-2b,
summarizes the cross-section standard, while FIGURE 2 in SECTION II
shows the pavement materials and thicknesses proposed by SRI.
TABLES A-2a and A-2c show the data used to describe the cross-
section and pavement design on the old road.
Traffic:
The SRI Traffic Case 4 was used, with the volumes and projec-
tions as shown in TABLE 1 in SECTION 2.
Vehicle Operating Costs
Normal traffic was divided into five basic categories: cars,
buses, and 7-ton, 10-ton, and 22-ton trucks. A detail description of
each category, and their respective financial and economic cost com-
ponents, used as inputs to the HCM, are shown in TABLES A-3a and A-3b.
Maintenance Policies:
The maintenance policy on the new asphalt road was specified
as follows:
surface patching 140 sq.m./km per year
seal coat every 5 years
shoulder grading 4 bladings per year
culvert-ditch cleaning 2 times per year
A maintenance policy obtained from Lyon Associates for the
old double bituminous surface treated road was defined as follows:
surface patching 900 sq.m./km. per year
seal coat every 5 years
regravelling of shoulders 400 cu.m./km. per year
brush control 2 times per year
culvert/ditch cleaning once per year
The unit maintenance and construction costs used in the model
are summarized in TABLES A-4 and B-5.
Reference [12].
3.1.2. COMPARISON OF THE HCM RESULTS WITH SRI
Construction Costs:
TABLE 6 shows the construction costs obtained with the HCM,
the SRI estimates and the percentage difference.
TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS
(Thousands of Tanzania Shillings)
(HCM) (SRI) (% diff)
Excavation plus Clearing 7,102 6 132 +16%
Pavement 32,543 33 500 - 3%
Drainage 1,890 9 438 -80%
Total 417,535-  4T-- T-
Total (with SRI drainage) 49,083
Excavation costs as calculated by the HCM are 16% higher, pave-
ment cost 3% lower than those estimated by SRI. At the feasibility
level these differences are within reason.
The volume of excavation required is computed by the construc-
tion submodel of the HCM based on a relationship between earth-
work quantity and the contour density (number of contour lines
crossed per unit length) along the alignment and the maximum allow-
Reference [10].
able grade. Clearing costs are for clearing of the entire Right
of Way prior to excavation. The volumes of materials required in
the pavement are computed from the geometry of the pavement section
(including shoulders) and multiplied by their respective unit costs,
in place, to obtain total pavement-cost.
The major difference is in the drainage estimate. SRI pro-
vided a lump sum for drainage, based on "on-site inspection" includ-
ing the cost of building reinforced concrete box culverts, 10 ft.
by 7 ft., and major structures spanning 30 ft. or greater. No
data was available regarding the exact number of these structures.
The HCM estimate, on the other hand, is based on the minimum drain-
age required in terms of reinforced concrete pipes ranging in
.diameter from 24" to 48" depending upon rainfall and topography
in the area.
In that the HCM methodology is based on a statistical dis-
tribution analysis and SRI's estimate on "on-site inspection", it
is expected that the latter estimate is more nearly correct.
The total construction cost as calculated by the HCM is
15% below the SRI estimate. Excluding the drainage (or correct-
ing for the differential) brings the difference to less than
one-tenth of one percent.
Maintenance Costs:
TABLE 7 summarizes the Present Value of the maintenance
costs to 1967 at 10%, obtained with the HCM, those estimated by
SRI, and the percent difference.
TABLE 7
PRESENT VALUE OF MAINTENANCE COSTS
(Thousands of Tanzania Shillings)
HCM SRI % diff
Old Road 10,449 26,009 -60%
New Road 7,724 16,100 -52%
Compared with the SRI estimates of maintenance costs, the HCM
estimate is 60% less on the old road and 52% less on the new road.
The main reason for this difference is in the assumptions under-
lying the estimation of maintenance costs.
The Road Deterioration and Maintenance Submodel* of the
HCM computes the amount of surface cracking as a function of traffic
and the pavement's structural strength. If this amount exceeds the
maximum amount of surface patching specified in the scheduled
maintenance policy, the full specified amount is done--otherwise
only that amount of cracking, as computed by the model, is patched.
Maintenance costs due to other scheduled activities such as seal
coating, brush control, shoulder grading and regraveling, and cul-
vert/ditch cleaning, are computed as fixed costs in the year i'n
which they occur.
Reference [10].
The SRI estimates on the other hand, are a function of the
ADT in each year, and are computed using the formulas given in
SECTION 2.2 SRI assumed that the structural quality of the road,
and hence its PSI, was maintained at the initial quality through-
out the analysis period.
In order to test the SRI assumption, the HCM was used to com-
pute the maintenance costs required to maintain the roads at various
PSI values. This was done by specifying demand responsive overlays
(5 cms) in the maintenance policies, such that the road was overlayed
each time its PSI value reached the minimum value specified. By vary-
ing the minimum allowable PSI value before the road is overlayed,
and comparing the associated maintenance costs, it was hoped to deter-
mine the level of quality (PSI) at which the old and the new roads
could be maintained with the SRI estimates of maintenance expendi-
ture. However, it was found that maintaining the old road at a PSI
above 2.0 would cost approximately 43 million shs, and at a PSI
above 1.0, 37 million shs. This is respectively, 17 and 11 million
shillings more than the 26 million shs. specified by SRI for maintain-
ing the road to its initial quality (PSI = 2.5).
Similarly, on the new road, it was found that it would cost
36 million shillings to maintain the road at a PSI of 1.0 and 25 mil-
PSI is the Present Serviceability Index developed during the AASHO
Road Test, reflecting the subjective quality of the pavement. The
PSI has been co-related to the structural number of the pavement,
equivalent axle loads, environment, subgrade strength and other
parameters such that a PSI of about 4.2 represents a pavement in
excellent, newly built condition while a PSI below 2.0 denotes a
navemernt in nno rAni-;
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lion shillings at a PSI of 0,5. Already these costs are respectively
20 and 9 million shillings more than the SRI estimate of 16 million
shillings to maintain the newly built road to its initial quality
(PSI = 4.2).
In other words, it was evident that the SRI estimates of
maintenance costs are not only insufficient to maintain the roads
at their initial qualities, but in fact seriously underestimate the
costs to maintain the roads even at a minimum PSI of one.
Vehicle Operating Costs:
Per kilometer vehicle operating costs (economic) by vehicle
type obtained with the HCM on the old road in the first year are
shown in TABLE 8.
Compared with the unit costs used by SRI (shown in TABLE 2)
the HCM estimates of vehicle maintenance costs for the 7 ton, 10
ton, and 22 ton trucks are much higher, while the depreciation costs
much lower. The HCM estimates of the wage costs are lower for all
vehicle categories, and the tire cost significantly higher for the
22 ton truck compared to SRI. Since the SRI report did not include
a detailed description of its derivation of vehicle operating costs,
it is not possible to explain the differences. It should also be
noted that SRI did not include administrative, insurance, and cargo
finance costs in their estimates.
TABLE 8
UNIT VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS ON OLD ROAD (HCM)
(Initial year, economic, shs/veh/km)
ITEM/VEHICLE Med. Ca r Bus 7 Ton Truck 10 Ton Truck 22 Ton Truick
Fuel
Oil
Maintenance
Tires
Wages
Depreciation
Administration
Insurance
Carqo
Total
Vehicle Speed
( kim/h r)
.309 .597
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The HCM estimates were based primarily on recent research
done in Kenya by the Transportation and Road Research Laboratory
of the U.K., and the input data used in deriving these costs is
summarized in TABLES A-3a and A3b.
A summary of vehicle operating costs on the old and new roads
used by SRI and thoseestimated with the HCM excluding adminstrative,
insurance and cargo finance costs, is presented in TABLE 9.
TABLE 9
SUMMARY AND COMPARISON OF VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS
(Initial year, economic, shs/veh/km)
Vehicle Type Old Road New Road
SRI HCM % Diff. SRI HCM % Diff
Cars .267 .289 +8% .214 .223 +4%
Buses .668 .481 -23% .534 .413 -23%
7 ton truck .596 .552 -7% .477 .462 -3%
10 ton truck 1.011 1.112 +10% .809 .887 +10%
22 ton truck 1.282 1.883 +47% 1.026 1.538 +50%
A detailed description of the Vehicle Operating Cost Methodology
is given in Chapter 4, Reference [10].
.
While the HCM estimates for cars, and 7 ton trucks are within
10% of the SRI estimates, the operating cost for buses is 23% lower
and for 22 ton trucks 50% higher than the SRI estimate. In the case
of buses, the lower cost is due mainly to lower maintenance and de-
preciation costs while in the case of the 22 Ton Truck category, the
difference is due mainly to higher maintenance and tire costs.
These differences, as pointed out earlier, are primarily due to in-
sufficient detailed data in the SRI report, though some of the dif-
ference may be due to differences in the methodology used.
The HCM estimates of vehicle operating costs on the old road
shown in TABLE 9 are derived for the traffic in the first year of
the analysis period, while those for the new road are for the traffic
in the fourth year, when the new road is scheduled to open.
As the road deteriorates in the subsequent years, the vehicle
operating costs increase due to the increase in surface roughness,
cracking and patching, and the change in the vehicle operating speeds.
This increase in the vehicle operating costs with the change in PSI
as the road deteriorates, is discussed in the following section.
Vehicle Operating Costs Versus PSI:
FIGURE 5a shows the change in per kilometer operating costs
of the five vehicle types on the old road during the entire analysis
period. FIGURE 5b shows the change in the PSI value during the same
time. FIGURES 6a and 6b show the same relationships on the new road.
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On the old road the unit operating costs increase significantly
in the first year, when the PSI drops from 2.5 to 1.0, and there-
after, the costs remain constant as the PSI is held constant at
one. On the new road the costs increase rapidly in the first three
years as 77% of the road, with subgrade CBR of 10% and less, deter-
iorates to PSI of 1.0 and thereafter the increase is more gradual
as the remainder of the road with CBR of 30% continues to deteriorate
to PSI of 1.0 in the next five years. Since the maintenance policy
for neither the old nor the new road provided for an overlay in the
analysis period, the roads would, theoretically, be expected to con-
tinue to deteriorate beyond a PSI of 1.0 and the vehicle operating
costs to increase exponentially. (See SECTION 3.3.2 for further dis-
cussion.) However, for the purposes of this experiment and the
feasibility level experiment discussed in SECTION 3.2. , the roads
were allowed to deteriorate up to a PSI of one, after which they
were assumed to deteriorate no further. The total vehicle operat-
ing costs computed by the model are, therefore, underestimated, es-
pecially on the old road.
The present value of the vehicle operating costs obtained with
the HCM, the SRI estimates, and the percent differences are pre-
sented in TABLE 10.
TABLE 10
PRESENT VALUE OF VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS
(Thousands of Tanzania Shillings)
HCM SRI %diff
Old Road 390,188 247,300 +58%
New Road 360,277 206,548 +75%
Compared to the SRI estimates of vehicle operating costs, the
HCM estimate is 58% higher on the old road, 75% higher on the new
road. The estimates with the HCM would be even higher if the road
were allowed to deteriorate below a PSI of one, instead of being
artificially held at that value. SRI's costs assume that the PSI
of both roads is preserved by their specified maintenance policies,
an assumption which does not appear warranted as shown in the Main-
tenance Costs discussion above.
Pavement Performance:
The old road was found to deteriorate from its initial PSI
value of 2.5 to 1.0 in the first year of the analysis period after
less than 95,000 18-kip Equivalent Single Axle Load (ESAL) applica-
tions on segments with a modified structural number of 1.73, and
less than 30 000 applications on seaments with modified structural
number 1.55. This was due to the poor structural quality of the old
road and the fact that it was already 13 years old.
On the new road, segments with subgrade CBR value of 7%
(modified structural number 2.84), deteriorated to PSI of 1.0 in
less than 2 years after 200,000 18-kip ESAL applications, and seg-
ments with CBR value of 10% (modified structural number 3.05), in
2 and 1/2 years, after a total of 300,000 18-kip ESAL applications.
Segments with a subgrade CBR of 30% (modified structural number of
3.76), lasted 8 and 1/2 years before reaching a PSI of 1.0 after
over one million 18-kip ESAL applications. It appears, therefore,
that the SRI pavement proposal is underdesigned on subgrades with
CBR values of 10% or less, but sufficient for subgrades with a CBR
of 30%.
3.1 .3. CONCLUSION
Several conclusions can be made based on the preceedinq ana-
lysis and the assumptions underlyino the HCM's operaton:
1. The maintenance expenditure specified by SRI is not suf-
ficient to maintain the old or the new roads at their
initial qualities, as presumably assumed by SRI, and it
would require considerable additional expenditure (in
the form of overlays) to maintain either road at a minimum
PSI of one.
2. The new pavement proposed by SRI is underdesigned for
subgrades with CBR 10% or less, and, therefore, over 75%
of the road drops to a PSI of one within three years
of the road's openinqg,
3) As a result of the above two observations, the vehicle
operating costs as estimated by SRI are much lower
than might be expected.
In the next section, which deals with evaluating different
pavement designs using different maintenance policies under varying
cases of traffic,loadinq, it will be shown that a pavement, cost-
ing almost the same as the SRI proposal (but designed using the AASHO
design criteria) remains at a PSI above 1.0 throughout the analysis
period, requires minimal maintenance, and causes considerably lower
vehicle operating costs.
3.2. Design and Evaluation of Feasibility Level Experiment
The primary objective of the feasibility level experiment
is to generate and evaluate a number of alternative strategies in
terms of different pavement designs and maintenance policies under
each of four different traffic loading cases.
The four traffic loading cases used in this section are de-
fined as follows:
Case 1 Present and projected traffic assuming normal growth
but no copper or developmental traffic.
Cas- 2 Case 1 plus transportation of Zambian copper in
excess of the 1966 level of production.
Case 3 Case 1 plus transportation of all Zambian copper,
Case 4 Case 3 plus developmental traffic due to comple-
mentary investments in development schemes along the
highway.
Traffic case.l and case 4.arethe same as those discussed earlier,
in SECTION 2.2. Case 2 and case 3 were redefined in order to
analyze the effect of the incremental growth in copper traffic
without developmental traffic. The volumes and projections for
each of the four traffic cases defined above are summarized in
TABLE 11.
TABLE 11
TRAFFIC VOLUMES USED IN FEASIBILITY LEVEL EXPERIMENT
VEHICLE CARS BUSES 7 TON 10 TON 22 TON 22 TON
TYPE TRUCK TRUCK TRUCK COPPER TRUCK
LOADING
CONDITION
CASE 1
1967 79 22 58 39 13 0
1980 239 54 98 66 22 0
Annual
Growth Rate % 8.9 7.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 0
CASE 2
1967 79 22 58 39 13 8
1980 239 54 98 66 22 100
Annual
Growth Rate % 8.9 7.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 21.4
CASE 3
1967 79 22 58 39 13 200
1980 239 54 98 66 22 300
Annual 8.9 7.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 3.2
Growth Rate %
CASE 4
1967 79 22 60 40 14 200
1980 239 54 101 91 32 300
Annual
Growth Rate % 8.9 7.2 4.1 6.5 6.5 3.2
Four Pavement types and five maintenance policies were defined
as follows:
Pavement Type 1 (PAVE 1) This was the old pavement with the
cross-section characteristics and pavement thicknesses given in
TABLES A.2a and A.2e respectively in Appendix A.
Pavement Type 2 (PAVE 2) and Pavement Type 3 (PAVE 3) were
the DCI trench design and the DCI modified design respectively,
shown in FIGURES 3 and 4 and described earlier under Section 2.3
Pavement Type 4 (PAVE 4) was the SRI design shown in FIGURE 2
and evaluated earlier under SECTION 3.1
Maintenance Policy 1 (MAINT-1) No maintenance at all.
Maintenance Policy 2 (MAINT-2) Moderate maintenance on the
DBST road with no overlays (same as that used in evaluating the
SRI proposals in SECTION 3.1).
Surface Patching 900 sq.m/km per year
Major Seal Coat every 5 years
Regravellina of Shoulders 2 times per year
Brush Control 2 times per year
Culvert/Ditch Cleaning once a year
Maintenance Policy 3 (MAINT-3) Increased maintenance on the
old road with a major overlay every 6 years, and increased fre-
quency of seal coating.
Surface Patching 900 sq.m/km per year
Major Seal Coat every two years
Overlay (5 cms.)
Resurfacing Gravel
Shoulders
Brush Control
Culvert/Ditch Clearing
every 6 years
400 cu.m./km per year
2 times per year
once a year
Maintenance Policy 4 (MAINT-4) Moderate maintenance on the
new asphalt concrete road with no overlay during the analysis
period. (Same policy used in evaluating the SRI proposals in
SECTION 3.1).
Surface Patching
Major Seal Coat
Grading of Gravel
Shoulders
Culvert/Ditch Clearinq
140 sq. m/km per year
every 5 years
4 bladings per year
2 times per year
Maintenance Policy 5 (MAINT-5) Intensive maintenance on as-
phalt concrete road, with twice the amount of surface patching,
increased frequency of seal coating, and an overlay every 6 years.
Surface Patching 280 sm/km per year
Major Seal Coat every 2 years
Overlay (5 cms.) every 6 years
Grading of Gravel 4 bladings per year
Shoulders
Culvert/Ditch Clearing 2 times per year
3.2.,1. DESIGN OF ALTERNATIVES TO BE EVALUATED
TABLE 12 gives the alternatives that were specified and eval-
uated for each traffic loading case and FIGURES 7a, 7b, and 7c give
the same alternatives for the four traffic cases in the form of de-
cision trees.
TABLE 12
ALTERNATIVES FOR EVALUATION
TRAFFIC LOADING PAVEMENT MAINTENANCE
CONDITION ALTERNATIVE TYPE POLICY
CASE 1 0 PAVE 1 MAINT 2
1 PAVE 1 MAINT 3
2 PAVE 2 MAINT 1
3 PAVE 2 MAINT 4
CASE 2 and 0 PAVE 1 MAINT 2
1 PAVE 1 MAINT 3
CASE 3 2 PAVE 2 MIANT 4
3 PAVE 2 MAINT 5
4 PAVE 3 MAINT 4
5 PAVE 3 MAINT 5
6 PAVE 4 MAINT 1
7 PAVE 4 MAINT 4
CASE 4 PAVE 1
PAVE 1
PAVE 3
PAVE 3
PAVE 4
PAVE 4
MAINT 2
MAINT 3
MAINT 4
MAINT 5
MAINT 4
MIAI NT 5
- -
MAINT 2
DAVI 1
TRAFFIC CASE 1
MAINT 3
MAINT 1
PAVE 2
MAINT 4
FIGURE 7a
DECISION TREE FOR ALTERNATIVES IN TRAFFIC CASE 1
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AND CASE 3
MAINT 3
MAINT 4
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MAINT 4
PAVE 3 
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PAV 4M INT 1
PAE VA- 4
MAINT 4
FIGURE 7b
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FIGURE 7c
DECISION TREE FOR ALTERNATIVES IN TRAFFIC CASE 4
4
5
'~1~915~"~K1900·~Olg~*~~l*r~·ll~-~-u~-
toA T 11mr
In all cases, the do nothina alternative was assumed to be
the old pavement (PAVE 1) with moderate maintenance (MAINT 2).
Specification of no-maintenance (MAINT 1) was not considered a
realistic alternative for all cases; it was specified only with Pave-
ment 2 in Traffic Case 1, and with Pavement 4 in Traffic Cases 2
and 3. For the lightest-traffic, (Case 1), only the cheapest
pavement (PAVE 2) with maintenance policies 4 and 5, and the exist-
ing pavement (PAVE 1) with maintenance policy 3 were considered to
be reasonable alternatives to the do-nothing case. Pavement 2,
which was the weakest of the three pavement designs for the new
road, was not considered a reasonable option for the heaviest
traffic (Case 4).
A construction period of three years was specified with 50%
of the construction costs in the first year, 30% in the second, and
20% in the third year. Since 98% of the construction is along a
new alignment, traffic was continued over the old road during the
three years of construction. Maintenance policy 2 was specified
for the old road during the construction period. Therefore, main-
tenance costs obtained for alternatives specified with the no-
maintenance policy refer to the maintenance costs on the old pave-
ment (PAVE 1) during the first three years, when the new road is
under.construction. As before an analysis period of 13 years was
used, from 1967 to 1980. (This includes three years of construc-
tion and ten years of service). However, ten years of service is
rather short for realizing the full value of the construction costs,
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therefore, a salvage value of 60% of the initial investment, dis-
counted over the analysis period, is used in the present experiment.
60% of the initial investment amounts to all of the excavation, base,
sub-base, and drainage costs, plus part of the surface cost components
of the total construction costs. After discounting at 10% over the
analysis period, the present-value of the salvage is only about 20%
of initial construction cost. Once again the PSI value of the road
was not allowed to go below one. This again understates the vehicle
operating costs especially on the old road which deteriorates to a
PSI of one in less than one year even with the lightest traffic
(Case 1).
3.2,2. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The HCM was used to compute construction, maintenance and
vehicle operating costs for each of the alternatives. A summary of
the Present Value of these costs, with the salvage values, where
applicable, and the total costs is presented in TABLES 13 throuah 16.
TABLE 13
SUMMARY OF TOTAL COSTS -- TRAFFIC CASE 1
(P.V. in Thousands of Shillings)
E 
VITANRETLA
(0) PAVE 1 -
MAINT 2
(1) PAVE 1 -
MA INT 3
(2) PAVE 2 -
MAINT 1
(3) PAVE 3 -
MAINT 4
rAl C TfI If'
UVI 43 I Rut-TION
0
0
28984
28984
MAINTEN-
ANrIE F
10449
34675
4017
7099
VEHICLE OP-
ERATING
109084
85942
97010
96590
SALVAGE
VALUE
TOTAL
COSTS RANKING
0
0
<5907>
<5907>
119533
120617
124104
126766
* Total costs higher than for the do-nothing alternative
;
• • - _ ;- - :. . • . . . .
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TABLE 14
SUMMARY OF TOTAL COSTS -- TRAFFIC. CASE 2
(P.V. in Thousands of Shillings)
CONSTRUC- MAINTEN- VEHICLE OP- SALVAGE TOTAL
ALTERNATIVE TION ANCE ERATING VALUE COSTS RANKING
0) PAVE 1 - MAINT 2 0 10449 144210 0 154659 2
1) PAVE 1 - MAINT:.3 0 34968 116623 0 151591 1
2) PAVE 2 - MAINT 4 28984 7105 129412 <5907> 159594 *
(3) PAVE 2 - MAINT 5 28984 20170 118888 <5907> 162135 *
(4) PAVE 3 - MAINT 4 30414 7101 128392 <6199> 159708 *
(5) PAVE 3 - MAINT 5 30414 20153 118103 <6199> 162471
(6) PAVE 4 - MAINT 1 35418 4485 127066 <7219> 159750
(7) PAVE 4 - MAINT 4 35418 7704 126583 <7219> 162486 *
j[
* Total costs higher than for the do-nothing alternative
TABLE 15
SUMMARY OF TOTAL COSTS-TRAFFIC CASE 3
(P.V. in Thousands of Shillings)
ALTERNATIVE
(0) PAVE 1-
(1) PAVE I -
(2) PAVE 2 -
(3) PAVE 2 -
(4) PAVE 3 -
(5) PAVE 3 -
(6) PAVE 4 -
(7) PAVE 4 -
MAINT-2.
MAINT-3
MAINT- 4
MAINT-5 .
MAI.NT- 4
MAINT-5
M~AINT-1
MAINT-4
CONSTRUCTIOPN
0
0
984
984
414
414
418
418
MAINTENANCE
449
689
124
337
122
322
485
727
VEHICLE OPERATING SALVAGE VALUE
378
339
355
332
353
330
350
349
695
399
230
305
719
178
265
373
0
0
<5907>
<5907>
<6199)>
(6199>
<7219>
<7219>
TOTAL COSTS
389
375
385
375
385
374
382
385
144
088
431
719
056
716
949
299
RANKING
c- -
--~--' 
-- I ,i, i
--·-- - --- -- ~ --
I
I I
SUMMARY OF
TABLE 16
TOTAL COSTS -- TRAFFIC CASE 4
(P.V. in Thousands of Shillings)
CONSTRUC- MAINTEN- VEHICLE OP- SALVAGE TOTAL
ALTERNATIVE TION ANCE ERATING VALUE COSTS RANKING
(0) PAVE 1 - .IAINT-2 0 10449 390188 0 400637
(1) PAVE 1 - MAINT-3 0 35699 350465 0 386164 2
(2) PAVE 3 - MAINT-4 30414 7123 364677 <6199> 396015
(3) PAVE 3 - MAINT-5 30414 20327 340222 <6199> 384764 1
(4) PAVE 4 - MAINT-4 35418 7727 360277 <7219> 396203
(5) PAVE 4 - MAINT-5 35418 22008 336655 <7219> 386862 3
CONSTRUCTION COSTS
Pavement Type 3 (DCI modified design) costs approximately 1.4
million shillings more than Pavement Type 2 which is the DCI trench
design. This additional cost is due to the extension of the crushed
stone (or sand asphalt) base and the gravel subbase across the entire
cross-section of the road, including the shoulders, as specified
in the DCI modified design. The SRI design costs 5 million shillings
more than the DCI modified design, mainly due to the additional 1.27
cms (1/2") of asphalt concrete surface and 5.08 (2") of crushed
stone base.
MAINTENANCE COSTS
The maintenance costs for the moderate maintenance policy
(MAINT-4) on the new road increase slightly with increases in the
intensity of traffic loading, from 7.099 million on Pavement 2 in
Traffic Case 1 to 7.124 on the same pavement in Traffic Case 3.
This slight increase is due to the increase in surface cracking,
and hence, surface patching, as a result of increased traffic in the
initial years when the full 140 sq.m/km of surface patching is not
yet required as specified in the maintenance policy. The amount of
surface patching performed (when less than 140 sq. m/km) also varies
with the type of pavement. For example, in Traffic Case 3 the main-
tenance cost on Pavement 3 for Maintenance Policy 4 is 7.122 million
and increases to 7.124 million on Pavement 2 and 7.72 on Pavement 4.
However, part of the increase on Pavement 4 is due also to the wider
CCU~UIF~rn~n~·I···I~·1·1·1-··--·--·---·
cross.ssectiQn. The same argument holds for Maintenance Policy 5
which includes an overlay after 6 years; the cost differences are
due to the differences in the amount of surface patching in the
initial years and the years immediately following the overlays.
On the old road, the maintenance cost for Maintenance Policy 2
is the same (10.499 million) for all traffic cases, This is because
the road deteriorates to a PSI of 1.0 in less than a year in all cases
and the full amount of 900 sq.m/km of surface patching is done each
year throughout the analysis period. However, the cost for Mainten-
ance Policy 3, which includes an overlay after six years, increases
from 34,675 million for Traffic Case 1 to 35.699 million for Traffic
Case 4 due to the differences in the amount of surface patching in
the years following the overlay.
VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS
Vehicle operating costs are primarily a function of traffic
and pavement deterioration. The increase in vehicle operating costs
due solely to the increase in traffic is apparent from the vehicle
operatings costs on the existing pavement (PAVE 1) with Maintenance
Policy 2: the cost in Traffic Case 1 is 109.1 million increasing to
144.2 million for Traffic Case 2 and 378.7 million for Case 3 and
390.2 for Case 4. Similarly the vehicle operating costs on Pavement
2 with Maintenance Policy 4 are 96.6 million in Case 1, 129.4 mil-
lion in Case 2 and 355.2 million in Case 3.
The differences in the vehicle operating costs within a part-
icular traffic case are due to the different deterioration character-
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'stics of the various pavements and different maintenance policies.
For example in Traffic Case 4, Table 16, the vehicle operat-
ing costs on Pavement 4 are 360.277 million shillings with Mainten-
ance Policy 4, but on Pavement 3 they are 364.677 million shillings
with the same Maintenance Policy; an increase of 4.4 million shill-
ings. This is primarily due to the fact that Pavement 3 with Main-
tenance Policy 4 is at or below a PSI of one for a longer duration
of time on most segments than Pavement 4. This difference in the
deterioration characteristics is seen more clearly in FIGURE 8, and
discussed under Pavement Deterioration.
Similarly the effect of maintenance policy on the vehicle operat-
ing cost is apparent from the same traffic case 4 in Table 16, where
going from Maintenance Policy 4 to Maintenance Policy 5 on Pavement 3
reduces.vehicle operating costs from 364.677 million shillings to
340.222 million shillings. This reduction is due to the improvement
made in the pavement strength by the overlay after 6 years, result-
ing in a slower rate of deterioration thereafter. A further dis-
cussion of the tradeoffs between different maintenance expenditures
and the incremental savings in vehicle operating costs is presented
under Maintenance Tradeoffs.
ALTERNATIVE RANKING
Judging from the total costs involved in terms of construction,
maintenance and vehicle operating costs (net of any salvage value),
it is apparent that building a new road for Traffic Cases 1 and 2
is not a cheaper alternative to the do-nothing case of using the
old road with4 moderate maintenance. However, for Traffic Case 2,
a cheaper alternative is to use the old road with increased mainten-
ance (including an overlay every six years). In thiscase an addi-
tional 24.5 million shillings in maintenance costs reduces vehicle
operating costs by 27.6 million shillings, a net saving of approx-
imately 3 million shillings.
For Traffic Cases 3 and 4, the alternative with the least
total cost is Pavement 3 (the DCI modified design) with an intensive
maintenance policy which includes an overlay after six years, seal
coating every 2 years, and 280 sq.m/km of surface patching each year.
The difference in the present value of total costs for this alterna-
tive and the do-nothing alternative is 14.4 million shillings in
Traffic Case 3 and 15.8 million in Traffic Case 4.
It is interesting to note that in Traffic Case 2 (which in-
cluded normal traffic plus transportation of the expected growth in
copper production above the 1966 level),savings in terms of reduced
vehicle operating costs are not sufficient to offset the capital
costs involved in building and maintaining a new road required to
transport the expected growth in copper production. However, these
reductions in operating expenses are significant for the traffic
cases involving transportation of all copper (Case 3) and all copper
plus developmental traffic (Case 4).
MAINTENANCE TRADEOFFS
Comparing the alternative of a moderate maintenance policy
(MAINT-4) to an intensive maintenance policy (MAINT-5) on Pavement 3
for Traffic Cases 2, 3, and 4, it is seen that the tradeoff ratio
between maintenance expenditure and user savings is 1:0.79 for
Traffic Case 2, increasing to 1:1.78 and 1:1.85 for heavier traf-
fic (Cases 3 and 4). In other words, at higher traffic levels such
as Case 3 and Case 4, the savings in user costs more than offset
increased maintenance costs due to overlays and the increased
frequency of sela coating and surface patching. On the other hand,
it would appear, by observing the difference in vehicle operating
costs on pavements with the options of no-maintenance (MAINT-1) and
moderate maintenance (MAINT-4) policies, such as Pavement 2 in
Traffic Case 1 (TABLE 13), and Pavement 4 in Traffic Case 2 and 3
(TABLES 14 and 15) that moderate maintenance which includes surface
patching and seal coating, but no overlays, has no significant
effect on vehicle operating costs. For example, on Pavement 2 in
Traffic Case 1 (TABLE 13), the additional cost of approximately 3
million shillings due to moderate maintenance reduces vehicle operat-
ing costs by less than one half million shillings. Similarly, on
Pavement 4 for Traffic Cases 2 and 3, the additional costs of
about 3.3 million shillings due to moderate maintenance reduces
vehicle operating costs by only one half million shillings in Traffic
The reader is reminded that the maintenance costs shown for the
policy of no maintenance (MAINT-1) refers to the maintenance costs
on the old road during the 3 year construction period.
Case 2 and about 1 million in Traffic Case 3. The reason for this
apparent insensitivity of vehicle operating costs to a moderate
maintenance effort is primarily the rapid deterioration character-
istics of the pavements in question.
Analysis with the HCM showed that less than 4 years after
opening, over 60% of the road with Pavement 2 deteriorated to a
PSI value of 1.0 under Traffic Case 1, and over 75% of the road with
Pavement 4 deteriorated to the same value under Traffic Cases 2 and
3. Therefore, any patching and sealing of surface cracks on pavements
that are structurally weak and have a high rate of deterioration,
causes no lasting improvement in the Present Serviceability Index of
the road, hence little change in the vehicle operating costs.
In such a situation, an overlay would be justified only if the
volume of traffic were high enough to give a ratio between incremental
user savings and the overlay cost greater than one, such as for Traf-
fic Case 3 shown earlier. Otherwise maintenance efforts, short of
adequate initial reconstruction, simPly waste resources.
PAVEMENT DETERIORATION
The pavement deterioration relationships used in the HCM for
paved roads with granular bases are derived primarily from the
AASHO Road Test, and the deterioration is predicted in terms of the
drop in the Present Serviceability Index (PSI).
The drop in the PSI in each year of the analysis period is
computed as a function of the volume of equivalent standard axles,
and the effective (or modlfied) structural number of the paye-
nents. The annual deterioration is modified by adding an annual
deterioration factor which incorporates time dependent deterioration
due solely to aging of the pavement.
The structural number of a pavement is defined by an empirical
relationship in which the thickness and strength of the pavement
layers are combined together as follows:
n
SN = E aiDi  ---------------- (1)
i=l
where, SN is the structural number,
ai is the strength coefficient of the ith layer,
Di is the thickness of the ith layer, in inches
and the summation is over all pavement layers.
The strength coefficients (ai) used in the HCM for various pave-
ment layer materials were as follows:
asphalt concrete 0.44
bituminous surface 0.20
crushed stone base 0.14
sand asphalt base 0.20
gravel subbase 0.11
sand subbase 0.08
The structural number is then modified (S-N) to take into
account the strength of the subgrade, environmental impact, and the
drainage characteristics of the base and subbase. The CBR value is
used to denote the subgrade strength, while a regional factor, RG,
is used as a proxy for the environmental impact, and a drainage
factor DF = 1.0 is used to denote reasonably well drained base and
subbase conditions. Higher drainage and regional factors indicate
weaker effective pavement strength.
For Pavements 3 and 4 a drainage factor of 1.0 was used while,
in the absence of better information, a drainage factor of 1.2 was
used for the trench design (Pavement 2), denoting a 20% poorer drain-
age characteristic compared with Pavement 3.
TABLE 17 summarizes the total number of 18 kip Equivalent Single
Axle Load (ESAL) applications that the SRI and the DCI modified de-
signs can withstand before reaching a PSI value of 2.0 on segments
with CBR values of 7% ,10% and 30% as computed with the HCM.
COMPARISON
SUBGRADE
CBR VALUE %
7
10
30
OF THE DCI AND
STRUCTURAL
NUMBER (SN)
DCI SRI
DESIGN DESIGN
2.81 2.27
2.12 2.27
1.36 2.27
TABLE 17
SRI PAVEMENT PERFORMANCE TO PSI OF 2.0
MODIFIED STRUCTURAL TOTAL 18 kip EQUIVA-
NUMBER (Sl) LENT SINGLE AXLE LOADS
(in thousands)
DCI SRI DCI SRI
DESIGN DESIGN DESIGN DESIGN
3.48 2.84 550 150
2.85 3.05 180 230
2.41 3.76 <60 970
For a detailed description of the pavement deterioration submodel
see Chapter 3 rReference 10].
It is seen that the DCI modified design reaches a PSI value of
2.0 after 550,000 18 kip ESAL applications on segments with subgrade
CBR value of 7% (modified structural number of 3.48); after 180,000
applications on subgrades with CBR value of 10% (modified structural
number of 2.86) and less than 60,000 applications onsubgrades with
CBR value of 30% (modified structural number of 2.41). Hence the
DCI pavement* is apparently underdesigned on subgrades with CBR
values of 10% and 30% but close to its expected performance on sub-
grades with CBR value of 7%.
The SRI pavement, on the other hand, which was not designed in
recognition of the underlying subgrade strength, is capable of taking
nearly a million applications of 18 kip ESAL's on subgrades with CBR
of 30% (modified structural number 3.76), but only 150,000 applica-
tions on a CBR of 7% before reaching a PSI value of 2.0.
Figures 8a, 8b and 8c compare the PSI versus time character-
istics of Pavements 3 and 4 (the DCI modified design and the SRI de-
sign) on subgrades with CBR values of 7%, 10% and 30% respectively
under the heaviest traffic (case 4). As was noted earlier, in SECTION
3.1 under Evaluation of the SRI Proposal, the SRI pavement is under-
signed on segments with CBR values of 10% and 7%. The DCI modified
design, (Pavement 3) on the other hand, deteriorates to a PSI of 1.0
This pavement was designed for 675,000 applications of 18 kip
equivalent single axles and a terminal PSI of 2.0, with variable
subbase thicknesses in recognition of the underlying subgrade
strength (described in SECTION 2.3 ).
on seq9ients with subgrade CBR values of 10% and 30% in less than 2
years, while on segments with a CBR of 7% in 6 years, so that it is
clearly underdesigned on segments with CBR values of 10% and 30%.
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3.2.3 EYALUATION OF A PAVEMENT DESIGNED ACCORDING TO AASHO DE-
SIGN CRITERIA
A new pavement, defined as Pavement Type 5, was designed using
the AASHO design criteria and evaluated under the heaviest traffic
loading (Case 4), and Maintenance Policies 4 and 5. The pavement was
designed to have a modified structural number of 4.4 (compared to
the highest value of 3.48 in the DCI design, and 3.76 in the SRI
design). The required structural numbers (SN) were 3.55 for a CBR of
7%, 3.25 for a CBR of 10% and 2.45 for a CBR of 30%. Using Equation 1
and the material coefficients given on page 73, the various pavement
layer thicknesses were computed as summarized in TABLE 18.
TABLE 18
PAVEMENT THICKNESSES - PAVEMENT TYPE 5
SURFACE (ASPHALT CONCRETE) 5.08(
BASE COURSE (CRUSHED STONE) 12.70
SUBBASE (GRAVEL)
on a subgrade with a CBR of 7% 46.41 ,
on a subgrade with a CBR of 10% 41.17
on a subgrade with a CBR of 30% 25.95 ,
cms
cms
cms
cms
cms
(2 ins)
(5 ins)
(18.27 ins)
(15.42 ins)
(10.22 ins)
Since Pavement 5 was designed to have the same modified struc-
tural number on all subgrades, the deterioration pattern did not
vary significantly on different segments, FIGURE 9 shows the deter-
ioration of Pavement 5 with Maintenance Policy 4 during the analysis
period. Due to the higher initial strength, Pavement 5 deteriorates
at a much slower rate than the SRI and DCI pavements, reaching a PSI
of 2.0 nine years after the opening of the road, and after a total of
just over 2 million 18 kip ESAL applications, It reaches a PSI of 1.7
at the end of the analysis period.
A summary of the present value (P.V,) of maintenance, construc-
tion, vehicle operating and total costs, net of salvage value, for
Pavement 5 with Maintenance Policy 4 and 5 under Traffic Case 4 is
presented in TABLE 19.
TABLE 19
SUMMARY OF TOTAL COSTS - TRAFFIC CASE 4 - PAVEMENT 5
(P.V, in Thousands of Shillings)
ALTERNA- CONSTRUC- MAINTEN- VEHICLE SALVAGE TOTAL
TIVE TION ANCE OPERATING VALUE COSTS
PAVE 5-
MAINT 4 35761 7556 298075 <7289> 334103
PAVE 5-
MAINT 5 35761 20491 293594 <7289> 342557
Comparing the results for Pavement 5 in TABLE 19 with the
previous alternatives for the same traffic (Case 4) in TABLE 16, it
can be noted that Pavement 5 costs about 5 million more to construct
than Pavement 3 (DCI modified design) and only 0.34 million more than
4.0
3.0
V) 2.0
1.0
n I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(1970) (1980)
FIGURE 9
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Pavement 4 (SRI design). The greater cost difference with the DCI
pavement is due to the greater depths of the surface, base and sub-
base. The vehicle operating costs are considerably lower on Pavement
5 because during a major portion of the analysis period the PSI value
is well above 2.0, the point after which the vehicle operating costs
begin to increase exponentially with further drop in PSI.
In comparing Maintenance Policy 5 with Policy 4 on Pavement 5,
we note that the additional maintenance cost of about 13 million shill-
ings reduces vehicle operating costs by only about 4.5 million. This
is due to the fact that the pavement is in relatively good condition
(PSI = 2.7) in the sixth year when the overlay is scheduled. There-
fore, the relative improvement in the road condition is small and the
corresponding savings in operating costs would also be small. This
is contrary to what one observes in the case of Pavements 3 and 4 in
TABLE 16, where change from the moderate to the intensive maintenance
policy on Pavement 3 costs about 13 million shillings more, but re-
duces vehicle operating costs by 23.6 million. This is made clearer
by observing the deterioration patterns of Pavements 3, 4 and 5 as
shown in FIGURES lOa and 10b for subgrade CBR values of 7% and 30%
respectively. FIGURE 10a, shows that 6 years after the opening of
the road, when the overlay is scheduled, Pavements 3 and 4 are already
at a PSI of 1.0, but Pavement 5 is at 2.7. In FIGURE 10b, Pavement 5
is at a PSI of 2.7 in Year 6, Pavement 3 at a PSI of 1.0 and Pave-
ment 4 at 2.0, so that the overlay has a greater impact on Pave-
ment 3 and 4 compared to Pavement 5 in restoring their PSI
values to 4.2, and decreasing vehicle operating costs.
In terms of least total costs, therefore, the cheapest alterna-
tive in Traffic Case 4 is to use the new pavement (PAVE 5) with only
moderate maintenance. Compared to the previous best alternative
(Pavement 3, the DCI modified design, with intensive maintenance) the
new pavement costs 5 million shillings more to construct, but re-
duces maintenance costs by 12.8 million shillings and vehicle operat-
ing costs by 42.1 million shillings. Compared to the SRI proposal
(Pavement 4 and and Maintenance Policy 4) we see that, although there
is not a significant difference in the initial construction and sub-
sequent maintenance costs, the vehicle operating costs on Pavement 5
are 62.2 million shillings less than on Pavement 4. In both cases
the savings in vehicle operating costs result primarily from the
slower rate of deterioration of Pavement 5,
This has interesting implications for government decisions on
initial investments for road building, especially when a large por-
tion of the investment is funded by international agencies and other
aid programs. In this situation, it would be appropriate for the
government to consider building a heavier pavement initially which
would require only moderate maintenance, thus making available for
investment elsewhere, the resources normally allocated to an inten-
sive maintenance policy.
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3.2.4 CONCLUSION
The following conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis.
I. For Traffic Cases 1 and 2, the alternative of building a new
road involves greater discounted total costs than the alternative of
using the old road. For Traffic Case 1, only moderate maintenance
is recommended on the old road, while for Traffic Case 2 an increased
maintenance policy, which includes an overlay after six years and
seal coating every two years, is recommended.
2. For the heavier traffic (Cases 3 and 4), the DCI modified de-
sign (PAVE 3) is cheaper in terms of total discounted costs than the
SRI design (PAVE 4). The DCI design, however, requires an intensive
maintenance policy of overlays every six years and seal coatings every
two years. The DCI design with this intensive maintenance will have
a PSI below 2.0 for most of the time before the overlay. This is due
to the initially weak design, which will result in relatively high
vehicle operating costs.
3. If a pavement is built weak initially, and hence, has a rapid
rate of deterioration, any increase in the frequency of seal coats
or surface patching does not reduce the vehicle operating costs sig-
nificantly.
4. A pavement built stronger initially would keep the new road
above a PSI of 2.0 for most of the time, requiring only moderate main-
tenance (no overlays) and resulting in substantially reduced vehicle
operating costs. Hence, a better alternative for Traffic Cases 3
and 4 would have been to build a stronger pavement, such as Pave-
ment 5, initially and do only moderate maintenance "in the future.
5. Governments confronted with uncertainties over future main-
tenance allocations or organizational inefficiencies in the execu-
tion of planned maintenance programs should seriously consider mak-
ing higher initial investments in constructing a stronger pavement.
Such pavements would require only moderate maintenance in the future,
be less sensitive to variations in maintenance budgets or practice,
and result in considerably lower vehicle operating costs.
6. Furthermore, this is of particular interest when a large por-
tion of the initial investment will be met by international funding
agencies through aid programs, while the entire maintenance expendi-
ture must be met from local resources.
3.3 Post Construction Investment Tradeoffs-
3.3.1. INTRODUCTION
The third phase of this case study covers the deterioration as-
pects of the Dar-Morogoro segment of the Tan-Zam Highway after its
construction. In this phase an attempt is made to predict the rates
of deterioration for different maintenance policies and the effic-
iencies of these policies under different traffic loading (and over-
loading) assumptions.
The analysis begins in 1970 with the start of construction of
the new Dar-Morogoro segment, and ends in 1993. The traffic at the
start of 1970 is shown in TABLE 20. These volumes are based on the
projections developed by DCI (TABLE 5) with the 7 and 10 ton truck
category split in the ratio 3:1.
TABLE 20
AVERAGE DAILY TRAFFIC ON DAR-MOROGORO SEGMENT IN 1970
Pass. Cars 50 Pass. Bus 7 Ton Truck 10 Ton Truck 22 Ton Truck
158 58 142 47 25
The new road was built during 1970-1973, according to the
Modified DeLeuw Cather (DCI) pavement design described in SECTION
2.3 and shown in FIGURE 4. During this period passenger car ADT
grew at 8.9% per year, buses at 7.2% and all trucks at 4.5%**
*Source: USAID [7] 80
When the road opened in 1973 (year 4 of our analysis) an impulse
traffic jump of 12.5% above the nominal growth rates was predicted by
DCI. We have not been able to verify this assumption from the lit-
erature or more current traffic counts. Thereafter, the rates of
growth of traffic continued as before for the duration of the
analysis period (to 1993) with one possible exception, a mode shift
of part of the medium and heavy truck traffic to the railroad.
The original schedule for the railroad link from Zambia to Dar-
es-Salaam called for completion of the railroad in 1979, at which
time DCI posited a one-time loss of 14.5% of the 7 and 10 ton and
35.5% of the 22 ton truck traffic. Current projections place the
opening, and, therefore, the shift, around 1976. The overall growth
pattern is summarized in TABLE 21.
TABLE 21
TRAFFIC GROWTH RATES (%)
1970-1973 1973-1974 1974-1993 1976 loss
during con. opening year nominal growth when RR opens
PASSENGER CARS 8.9 21.4 8.9
BUSES 7.2 19.7 7.2
7 & 10 TON TRUCKS 4.5 17.0 4.5 -14.5
22 TON TRUCKS 4.5 17.0 4.5 -35.5
33.2. MAINTENANCE POLICIES
The first issue to be analyzed concerns the effect of various
maintenance policies on the deterioration of the road. The concern
here is primarily with the trade-off which exists between the mainten-
ance cost and vehicle operating costs. The vehicle operating cost
is affected by the deterioration of the road, and using the HCM one
is able to aenerate the time stream of maintenance costs and vehicle
operating costs for a selected number of maintenance policies.
Three policies are specified for this analysis. These policies
are shown in TABLE 22. In order to represent more accurately the
costs of vehicle operation on failed roads, the PSI was allowed to
drop to zero, rather than one as used earlier.
TABLE 22
ASPHALT MAINTENANCE POLICIES
Moderate Intensive Responsive
SURFACE PATCHING
(m2/km/yr) 140 280 280
SEAL COATS every 5 years every 2 years every 2 years
(Frequency)
OVERLAYS OF 5 cm. none every 6 years when PSI on seg-
ment drops below
2.5
SHOULDER GRADING 4 4 4(Bladings per year)
CULVERT CLEANING 2 2 2
(Times per year)
The first is a scheduled policy and includes surface patching
each year, seal coats applied every five years, shoulder grading,
and culvert cleaning. No overlays are performed over the life of
the road in this first policy. It is referred to as the moderate
policy, and is the same as MAINT 4 specified earlier.
The second policy is a more intensive scheduled policy than
the first. Twice as much patching is done each year, and seal coats
are applied very two years. Shoulder grading and culvert cleaning
are as before. In addition, this policy provides for overlays of 5
cm every six years. This is the intensive policy, and is identical to
MAINT 5.
The third policy is identical to the second, except the overlays
are not scheduled, but rather are set to occur whenever the PSI of
the section drops below 2.5. This is referred to as the demand-
responsive, or responsive, policy.
The moderate policy is substituted for both the intensive
policy and the responsive policy in year 20 to prevent overlaying near
the end of the analysis horizon.
FIGURE 11 shows the present worth of the 1970 to 1993 stream
of maintenance and vehicle operating costs (economic) for the three
maintenance policies. The cost streams are.discounted at 10% to
a present value in 1970. The three columns of costs have been labeled
A, C, and E to simplify reference in the text.
The additional maintenance expenditure to go from the moderate
policy (Column A) to the intensive policy (Column C) is about 18.7
million shillings. The return to this expenditure, in terms of
vehicle operating cost savings, is about 61 million shillings. In
other words for each additional shilling of maintenance expendi-
ture, over three shillings in operating costs are saved.
If the government seeks a minimum total cost solution, then the
intensive maintenance policy would be recommended over the moderate.
On the other hand, if the government wishes to transfer more of the
cost of the infrastructure to the local transport industry and road
users or if there are budgetary constraints, it may choose the mod-
erate policy. It should be noted, however, that adoption of the mod-
erate policy will not only cause the public to bear the additional
cost, but will also result in a net loss (extra cost) to the nation
as a whole of 42.3 million shillings. The intensive policy would
have an incremental benefit to cost ratio of 3.0 at 10% discount
rate and a life span of 23 years, and since few investment opportuni-
ties yield such a high return, it is unlikely thatthe government
would choose the moderate policy solution over the intensive.
Assuming, therefore, the minumum total cost solution is the
objective, it is interesting to examine the responsive maintenance
policy costs (Column E). For an additional maintenance expenditure
over the intensive policy of about 1.4 million shillings, a further
savings in vehicle operating costs of 23.6 million shillings occurs--
an incremental benefit to cost ratio of nearly 17.0. It is perhaps
easier to understand this large savings in user costs for a small
increment in maintenance expenditure by examining the rate of deter-
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FIGURE 11
COMPARISON OF TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS ON
AS BUILT ROAD FOR THREE MAINTENANCE POLICIES
] I Vehicle Operating
Costs
eQ Maintenance Costs
ioration on three segments of the road which represent about 62% of
the total length.
Segment 101 is 68 kilometers long and is 37% of the entire
Dar-es-Salaam--Morogoro section of the Tan-Zam Road. It has a sub-
grade CBR of 10% (the lowest in the project is 7%) and its pavement
has a structural number of 2.12. The modified structural number
(modified for a subgrade CBR and local environmental factors) is
2.86. Without any overlays this pavement deteriorates to a Present
Serviceability Index (PSI), as calculated by the HCM, of zero with
five years of operation; PSI falls below two after only 2-1/2 years
of service.
FIGURE 12 shows the deterioration of Segment 101, expressed as
PSI versus time for the intensive maintenance policy (solid line) and
the responsive policy (broken line) from the opening of the road in
1973 to the end of the analysis period. Overlays under the intensive
policy occur in years 1978-79 and 1984-85. Overlays for the respon-
sive policy occur in 1975-76 (three years earlier), and in 1983-84
(one year earlier). The cost of these overlays are identical in the
year they occur, however, discounting causes earlier overlays to have
a higher present value in 1970, thus accounting for part of the extra
cost.
Segments 103 (kilometer 88 to 103) and 105 (kilometer 118 to
144) represent about 23% of the entire Dar-es-Salaam--Morogoro sec-
tion of the Tan-Zam Road. They have a subgrade CBR of 30% and a
structural number of 1.36. The modified structural number is 2.44.
Without any overlays, the pavement deteriorates to a PSI, as cal-
culated by the HCM, of zero with two years of operation, passing PSI =
2.0 after only one year.
FIGURE 13 shows the deterioration of Segments 103 and 105,
expressed as PSI versus time for the intensive maintenance policy
(solid line) and the responsive policy (broken line) from the open-
ing in 1973 to the end of the analysis period. Overlays under the
intensive policy occur in years 1978-79 and 1984-85. Overlays for
the responsive policy occur in years 1973-74 (the opening year and
5 years before the first scheduled overlay) and in 1980-81 (four
years before the second scheduled overlay).
The large difference in user costs between the two policies--
23.6 million shillings--results because, in the case of Segment 101
for the responsive policy, the PSI goes below 2.0 for only half of
1975, whereas for the intensive policy 4-3/4 years are below PSI
2.0; 2-1/2 of which the pavement has a PSI below one. This difference
is even more significant in the case of Segments 103 and 105. The
implications of this difference are best understood by reference to
FIGURE 14 which shows the relationship between PSI and a Vehicle
Operating Cost Index.
The indexing expresses the vehicle operating cost for this road
calculated at a PSI of 4.2 as 100. This permits other costs (which
will be higher at lower PSI levels) to be read as a percent increase
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FIGURE 12
PSI VERSUS TIME FOR INTENSIVE AND RESPONSIVE
MAINTENANCE POLICIES - NO OVERLOADING
(Segment 101)
above the optimum level. At a PSI of 2.0, the vehicle operating costs
index is about 108, i.e. at PSI = 2.0 vehicle costs are about 8%
above those calculated at PSI = 4.2. Below a PSI of 2.0, the curve
grows exponentially giving an index of 130 at PSI = 1.0 and an index
of 175 at PSI = 0.4. Twenty-two percent higher costs for vehicle
operation are incurred between PSI 2.0 and 1.0 than between 4.2 and
2.0. This higher cost represents the penalty incurred because the
maintenance policy was unable to maintain a lower bound of PSI at
2.0. Had we specified a policy which could maintain the pavement PSI
above the value of two, the penalty of 22% higher operating costs need
not have been charged.
A PSI of 0.4 was interpreted as a virtually unserviceable road
and not specifying a policy to keep the road's PSI at 1.0 incurred a
45% surcharge on costs above the costs incurred at a PSI of 1.0
It has been shown that the HCM can be used to predict changes
in deterioration due to changes in the maintenance policy and, in
turn, the effect on vehicle operating costs were substantially higher,
as were total costs, than if overlaying was performed.
Secondly, it was shown that substantial vehicle operating and
total cost savings could be achieved if the timing of overlays was
demand-responsive rather than scheduled. The incremental maintenance
expenditure required for a demand-responsive policy was about 5% of
the savings.
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3.3.3. OVERLOADING COSTS
A serious problem affecting the performance of the Tan-Zam
Highway is accelerated pavement damage due to truck overloading. A
22 ton truck-trailer combination, for example, carrying 30% extra
payload applies over twice as many 18 kip equivalent single axle loads
as when normally loaded (equivalence factor 4.160 vs. 2.017).
There are four basic ways to represent overloading. One
method assumes total commodity transported to be fixed and asoverload-
ing increases, the volume of transport traffic required decreases.
A second method assumes that the traffic volume is fixed and total
commodity is increasing. The excess commodity will result from
lowered prices for the excess loads picked up along the road.
Thirdly, if one posits enforcement, one can suppose that some per-
centage of the overloaded vehicles will avoid detection. Finally,
if one does not assume load limit enforcement, one can assume that
a certain percentage of overloaded vehicles will be on the road.
Of these possible options, the most extreme in terms of damage to
the road at any maintenance policy level would be to overload all
medium and heavy transport vehicles without descreasing the traffic
volume or its rate of growth.
To examine the effects of overloading on the Dar--Morogoro
Road, the load factor (portion of maximum payload carried) was set
to 1.3 (a 30% overload) for all ten and twenty-two ton trucks in
both directions. The effects of the 30% overloading at all three
maintenance policies are shown inFIGURE 15, Columns B, D, and F.
For both the moderate policy (columns A and B) and the inten-
sive policy (columns C and D) maintenance costs were essentially
the same. Small increases, in the order of 0.1% and 0.4% respec-
tively, were observed for the 30% overloaded traffic. These dif-
ferences resulted from the slightly higher demand for patching re-
quired for the overloaded traffic in the years just after opening
or overlaying before the total quantity of patching reached the maxi-
mum specified TABLE 22. Once the maximum was reached, maintenance
costs were equal.
For the moderate policy, the vehicle operating costs were
12.3 million shillings higher due to the overloading because of the
more rapid deterioration of the road. Segment 101, for example,
reached PSI = 0.25. in 1975, two years earlier than in the normally
loaded case.
With the intensive policy, the difference in vehicle operat-
ing costs due to the 30% overloading was 15.7 million shillings.
Once again, this was the result of a more rapid deterioration of the
road.
In both scheduled maintenance policy cases, the maintenance
costs remained constant and the entire cost of overloading was passed
on to the vehicle owner/operator in the form of higher vehicle operat-
ing costs.
The true differences are somewhat difficult to compute be-
cause the HCM does not allow PSI to drop below 0.0; yet we have no
justification for assuming that the scheduled maintenance policies
can in fact keep PSI at that level.
For the responsive policy (columns E and F) the maintenance
costs were 3.8 million shillings higher for the 30% overload case.
FIGURE 16 shows, for Segments 101, 103, and 105, that this difference
resulted from earlier overlays for the 30% overloading case; usually
about two years earlier on the second overlay. Had a third overlay
been permitted the spread would have reached three years in most
cases.
The difference in vehicle operating costs was 3.9 million
shillings, due to a normally lower PSI in the overloaded case--though
not as wide a difference as in the moderate and intensive policy cases.
TABLE 23 compares the increase in the present worth of mainten-
ance, vehicle operating, and total costs at each maintenance policy
level due to 30% overloading of medium and heavy trucks.
TABLE 23
INCREASED COSTS DUE TO 30% OVERLOADING OF TRUCKS
(million shillings discounted @ 10% to 1970)
Moderate Intensive Responsive
MAINTENANCE COSTS -- (0.1%) 0.1 (0.4%) 3.8 (13.2%)
VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS 12.3 (3.6%) 15.7 (5.6%) 3.9 (1.5%)
TOTAL COST 12.3 (3.5%) 15.8 (5.1%) 7.7 (2.7%)
100
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FIGURE 15
COilPARISON OF TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS ON THE AS-BUILT
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Summarizing, one can see that for the scheduled policies the
increased costs were borne nearly 100% by the operators, whereas the
responsive policy shared the extra cost equally between the operators
and the government. The benefit gained by sharing the costs equally
was a savings of as much as 50% of the cost of the overloading.
The conclusion of this investigation is that, using the HCM,
one can predict the presence and magnitude of overloading costs and
the relative effectiveness of different maintenance policies in cop-
ing with the extra damage (expressed through increased vehicle operat-
ing costs). Additionally, the amount and allocation of these costs
can be controlled by a proper design of the maintenance policies. In
all cases the PSI responsive policy provides the cheapest solution
for government and users.
Whether or not government would choose to permit overloading to
any degree is a separate decision, to which this HCM analysis pro-
vides on essential set of information--the infrastructural mainten-
ance and operating cost increments. The 30% overloading represents
nearly four million tons of additional cargo over the analysis
period. The economic value to the nation may warrant the increased
expenditure and its financial value may warrant the increased operat-
ing costs.
3.3.4. A NEW PAVEMENT (TYPE FIVE)
Referring once again to FIGURE 15 we observe that the respon-
sive maintenance policy even under the 30% overloading assumption
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(column F) provides a substantially cheaper total cost solution
for the road than either of the scheduled policies even assuming no
overloading. That this indicates a responsive policy as the best
choice under all conditions for this road is obvious, but this con-
clusion poses an interesting question.
If the large savings in total cost under the responsive main-
tenance policy are resulting primarily from the earlier first over-
lay which would not permit the PSI to drop below 2.5, then the spec-
ification of a better strategy of initial design and maintenance may
be possible. To examine this hypothesis, the same three maintenance
policies and two traffic conditions were applied assuming a different
pavement design (Pavement Type Five), described in SECTION 3.2
were used on this road.
FIGURE 17 repeats the information for the as-built pavement
from FIGURE 15, and superimposes on it the same costs for Pavement
Type Five.
The discounted construction cost for the as-built pavement, as
calculated by the HCM, is 30.4 million shillings; for Pavement Five,
it is 35.8. The construction difference of 5.4 million shillings
(18%) is added to the maintenance and vehicle operating costs of the
new pavement to enable total cost differences to be compared.
There are several advantages which can be seen for Pavement
Fiye; the most obvious is the relative insensitivity to choice of
maintenance policy or overloading condition. The full range (column B
less column E) for the as-built road is 76.8 million; for Pavement
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Five it is 21.1 million. (The rance on the as-built pavement is
actually understated because of the artificial limit of PSI stopping
at zero.) For example, on Segment 101 of the existing road, when
traffic is 30% overloaded and the maintenance policy calls for no
overlays (moderate), the PSI reaches 2.0 in 1974 and 1.0 in 1976
after which it is artificially maintained at that value. On Pave-
ment Five, under the same conditions, the PSI reaches 2.0 in 1984
and at the end of the analysis period has a value of 0.08. This ex-
plains in part, the 60 million shillings savings shown in column B for
Pavement Five over the as-built road.
Pavement Five offers an interesting tradeoff to government.
If we compare the total cost of Pavement Five with moderate mainten-
ance to the total cost of the as-built pavement with the responsive
policy, we notice that Pavement Five has a higher total cost of 7.2
million shillings with no overloading, and 9.5 million shillings with
30% overloading. However, the cost distribution is shifted dramat-
ically, at the expense of the owner/operator. TABLE 24 shows the
distribution of costs.
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TABLE 24
Cost Distribution Comparison of the As-Built
Road With Responsive Policy and Pavement Five With
Moderate Policy Under Both Traffic Loading Conditions
(million shillings)
Pavement Type 5 As-Built Pa
Moderate Policy Responsive
No Overload 30% Overload No Overload 30,
COST* 293.8 303.8 286.6
) USER 279.7 289.7 257.7
) GOV'T* 14.1 14.1 28.9
vement
Policy
% Overload
294.3
261.6
32.7
*Includes only construction cost differential of 5.4
By using Pavment Five with only a moderate maintenance policy
the government would save themselves 14.8 million and 18.6 million
shillings for the no overload and 30% overload cases respectively,
and increase the user cost by 22.0 and 28.1 million shillings respec-
tively. Although Pavement Five with the responsive policy will pro-
vide the cheapest solution (both total and to government) the advan-
tage of the moderate policy/Pavement Five solution is the removal of
any dependency on future maintenance overlaying operations (as well
as unforeseen future budgetary problems) for an 18% higher construc-
tion investment.
This conclusion is of special interest in the case of an inter-
nationally funded road, where the funding agency pays the foreign
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currency component of the new construction, whereas the government
is normally 100% responsible for any future maintenance costs.
Our original intention for running Pvement Five was to test
the hypothesis that lower cost solutions could be achieved by a
better strategy of initial design and maintenance. Having demon-
strated this, we shall try to apply the results to a recommendation
for a lower cost solution for the future maintenance of the Tan-Zam
Road investment.
3.3.5. RECOMMENDATION
The recommendation we will test is in accordance with the ob-
served savings accrued by a stronqer initial pavement. We will test
the total cost of maintaining the Dar-Morogoro segment to a moderate
maintenance policy standard with a one-time overlay (actually a recon-
struction) of 10 centimeters. This overlay is twice the thickness of
a normal overlay and would be applied in 1974, 1975, or 1976. This
will permit a comparison of what the total costs would be if the work
were done this year (1975), last year (1974), or next year (1976). We
will only use the 30% overload case.
FIGURE 18 shows the maintenance costs, vehicle operating costs
and total costs for the three years tested under moderate maintenance
compared to the intensive or the responsive maintenance policies, for
the 30% overloaded case.
The differences between 1974 vs 1975 or 1975 vs 1976 are on
the order of 1/2%. They all fall between the intensive and respon-
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sive policies in terms of total cost and user costs. Maintenance
costs are above the responsive costsin 1974, but between the inten-
sive and responsive costs for 1975 and 1976.
Either the 1975 or 1976 solution would be a lower cost solu-
tion for government with only a 14 to 18 million shilling surcharge
to the vehicle owner/operators.
Delaying the ten centimeter overlay appears to decrease the
present worth of the overlay by about 2.1 million shillings per year,
and increase the vehicle operating costs about 4 million per year.
If we were to delay the 10 centimeter overlay until 1978 this would
decrease the maintenance present worth to about 25 million shillings,
the vehicle operating costs and total costs would increase to 287
and 312 million shillings respectively. However, 1978 is the year
in which the first scheduled overlay would normally occur under the
intensive policy. In other words, if we double the first scheduled
overlay in 1978 and then return to the moderate policy, government
would save about two and one-half million shillings and the vehicle
owner/operators would save about 10 million shillings; a total cost
reduction of about twelve and one-half million shillings over the in-
tensive policy solution.
One question arising out of this comparison is the discrepancy
in maintenance costs between the intensive policy (with two 5 cm.
overlays) and the 1978 double overlay with moderate maintenance. The
question arises because the present worth at 10% of the second 5 cm.
overlay in the intensive policy is only 56% of the present worth of
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the extra 5 cm. of asphalt in the double 1978 overlay, yet the main-
tenance cost is hiqgher with the intensive policy.
The explanation for this difference is patching and seal coat
costs. Under the intensive policy twice as much patching is per-
formed as under the moderate policy and seal coats are every two as
opposed to every five years (see TABLE 22). The difference in the
present worth of this extra patching and seal coating not only com-
pensates for the difference in the discounted value of the second 5
centimeter overlay, but also provides the extra two and one-half
million shillings savings.
Based on this extra run, the recommended strategy would be an
early scheduled double overlay preceeded and followed by a moderate
maintenance effort. This overlay should occur no later than 1978,
the year for the first scheduled overlay under the intensive policy.
Earlier placement of the double overlay would decrease vehicle costs
by about four million shillings per year, but would increase the govern-
ment's maintenance expenditure by about two million shillings per
year. Scheduling this double overlay prior to 1975 would increase
the maintenance expenditure over that expected for the responsive
policy. (The reader is reminded, once again, that vehicle operating
costs at PSI = 0.0 are not wholly accurate, as explained earlier. A
more accurate representation of these costs might change the recom-
mended solution by a year).
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3.3.6. CONCLUSION
1. This phase of the Tan-Zam Case Study has investigated various
strategies for the post construction investment period. It was
shown that, regardless of the extent of vehicle overloading, a de-
mand-responsive scheduling of five centimeter pavement overlays would
provide a lower cost solution than a scheduled policy. Naturally, a
scheduled policy based on the deterioration predictions could be de-
veloped.
2. As an intermediate step to a final recommendation, it was
shown that an additional investment of 5.4 million shillings during
construction could have provided, in all cases, a road solution that
was both lower in total cost as well as less sensitive to the various
types of maintenance policies examined.
3. A final recommendation was presented which called for a double
(ten centimeter) overlay sometime during 1977 or 1978 with only a
moderate maintenance effort before and after the overlay. The
fiscal advantages of this recomnendation over the intensive policy
were lower total as well as vehicle operating costs, and an equiva-
lent or lower requirement for government maintenance expenditure.
A secondary advantage was the lowered requirement for maintenance
effort in the non-overlay years.
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4. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The application and use of the Highway Cost Model was demon-
strated in the present case-study in three different experiments
with the model. While the results of the experiments are discussed
at length in the text of the thesis, complete with conclusions of
each experiment, a summary of major findings and conclusions is pre-
sented below.
By specifying different demand responsive maintenance policies,
it was possible to compute, using the HCM, the maintenance expenditure
that would be required to maintain the old and new roads such that
their Present Serviceability Index never fell below a specified mini-
mum. As a result, it was shown that the maintenance expenditure
estimated by SRI was not sufficient to maintain the old and the pro-
posed new roads at their initial qualities,i.e. to PSI of 2.5 and
4.2 respectively, and that it would require considerable additional
expenditure (in the form of overlays) to maintain either road, even
at a minimal PSI of 1.0.
By analyzing the yearly reports on pavement conditions, as
computed by the HCM, it was possible to analyze the deterioration
characteristics of the SRI pavement proposal under the heaviest traf-
fic (Case 4) and a moderate maintenance policy that included no over-
lays. It was found that the SRI pavement design (based solely on
the volume of traffic without any recognition of the underlying sub-
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grade strength), was grossly underdesigned on subgrades with CBR
of 10% or less (modified structural number less than 3.05), such that
more than 75% of the road deteriorated to a PSI of 1.0 within three
years of being subjected to the estimated traffic. However, on sub-
grades with CBR of 30% (modified structural number 3.76) the pavement
lasted more than eight years before reaching a PSI of 1.0.
In a feasibility level experiment with the HCM, it was shown
that the model could be used to evaluate simultaneously a larger
number of alternatives in terms of different pavement designs and
maintenance policies. By comparing the total discounted costs (sum
of construction, maintenance, and vehicle operating), it was possible
to identify the alternative with minimum total cost in each of the
four possible cases of traffic projections considered in the case
study. The analysis showed that savings in terms of total reduced
vehicle operating costs were not sufficient to offset the capital
costs involved in constructing and maintaining a new road if only a
limited portion of the current and expected growth in copper traffic
were to be transported over the Tan-Zam Highway.
The feasibility level analysis also showed that of the three
pavement design alternatives, the DCI trench design, the DCI mod-
ified design, and the SRI proposal, the alternative with the least
total costs under Traffic Case 4, was the DCI modified design with
an intensive maintenance policy that included a 5 cm. overlay every
six years and a major seal coat every two years. However, the deter-
ioration characteristics of the DCI modified design showed rapid
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deterioration of the pavement,so that,for most of the time before
the overlays,the pavement was at a PSI below 2.0 resulting in rela-
tively high vehicle operating costs. This was due to the initial
weak design of the pavement--modified structural numbers ranged from
2.41 on a CBR of 30% to 3.48 on a CBR of 7%.
A lower cost solution than the DCI modified design was found to
be a much stronger pavement (modified structural number 4.4 on all
segments) that required only a minimal maintenance effort without any
overlay during the analysis period. Evaluation with the HCM showed
that although the pavement cost 5 million shillings more to construct
than the DCI modified design, it reduced maintenance costs by 12.8
million and vehicle operating costs by 42.1 million, a net savings
of about 50 million shillings.
Finally, using the HCM, it was possible to examine the effects
of traffic overloading on pavement deterioration and to evaluate post-
construction investment strategies in terms of different maintenance
policies for the as-built road. It was shown that, using the HCM,
one can predict the presence and magnitude of overloading costs and
the relative effectiveness of different maintenance policies in cop-
ing with the extra damage (expressed through increased vehicle operat-
ing costs). In the case of the newly built road between Dar-es-
Salaam and Morogoro, it was shown that regardless of the extent of
vehicle overloading, a demand-responsive scheduling of 5 cm. overlays
would provide a lower cost solution than a maintenance policy with
overlays scheduled for 6 year intervals without consideration of
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the deterioration rate.
As a final recommendation, it was shown that a one time double
overlay (10 cm) sometime in 1977 or 1978, with only a moderate main-
tenance effort before and after the overlay; would not only reduce
total maintenance and vehicle operating costs below those for an in-
tensive maintenance policy, but also avoid any dependency on the
scheduling and execution of 5 cm. overlays at different times during
the analysis period.
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6. APPENDIX A:
DOCUMENTATION OF DETAILED INPUTS TO HCM
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1. Segment Description and Alignment Characteristics
Figure A-I shows a sketch of the segmentation and coding sys-
tem used to describe the existing and new alignments of the case
study section. Table Ala and Alb summarize the characteristics
describing each segment on the two alignments.
TABLE Ala. SEGMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OLD ROAD
Av. Curvature
(deg/km)
39.69
16.18
47.17
3.40
CBR
(%)
Av.Rise
(m/km)
14 8.23
7 8.94
7 11.45
35 1.52
Av.Fall(m/km)
15.81
15.60
15.00
4.56
Annual Rain-
fall (mm)
825
816
846
1184
TABLE Alb. SEGMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW ROAD
Segment Length
Number (km)
101
102
103
104
105
106
108
68.0
20.0
15.0
15.0
26.0
9.55
17.65
Av. Curvature
(deg/km)
6.25
5.45
3.20
5.13
16.42
16.07
6.80
CBR
(%)
Av.Rise
(m/km)
10 1.79
7 1.52
30 1.01
8 2.02
30 6.72
7 3.98
7 11.20
Av. Fall
(m/km)
6.93
4.94
2.03
5.57
1.17
3.98
13.78
Annual Rain-
fall (mm)
825
825
825
825
825
825
846
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Segment
Number
110
107
111
109
Length
(km)
160.25
3.40
19.25
10.00
(Source - Geometric characteristics and rainfall data from contour
maps in SRI [11] report, subgrade CBR from DCI [13]).
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FIGURE A-i
SEGMENT CODING ALONG HORIZONTAL ALIGNMENTS
(not to scale)
08 109
-111
AM
TABLE A2a. CROSS-SECTION CHARACTERISTISICS OF OLD ROAD
Riding Ditch Ditch
Surface Shoulder Side Bottom R.O.W. Cut Fill
Width (m) 3.05 1.22 1.80 .35 9.27 -- --
Slopes (rise/run) .03 .04 .33 0 -- 1.0 .67
TABLE A2b. CROSS-SECTION CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW ROAD (SRI)
Riding Ditch Ditch
Surface Shoulder Side Bottom R.O.W. Cut Fill
Width (m) 3.65 2.43 1.82 .35 19.47 -- --
Slope (rise/run) .03 .04 .33 0 -- 1.0 0.67
TABLE A2c. CROSS-SECTION CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW ROAD (DCI TRENCH DEISGN)
Riding Ditch Ditch
Surface Shoulder Slope Bottom R.O.W. Cut Fill
Width (m) 3.35 1.83 1.82 .35 19.18 -- --
Slope (rise/run) .03 .05 .33 0 -- .33 .667
TABLE A2d. CROSS-SECTION CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW ROAD (DCI MODIFIED DE-
SIGN
Riding Ditch Ditch
Surface Shoulder Slope Bottom R.O.W. Cut Fill
Width (m) 3.35 1.83 1.82 .35 18.88 -- --
Slope (rise/run) .03 .068 .33 0 -- .33 .667
........
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TABLE A2e. PAVEMENT THICKNESSES ON OLD ROAD
Pavement Layer Segment Segment
110 107, 111, 109
Surface (DBST) 2.5 cm. 2.5 cm.
Base (crushed stone) 6.4 cm. 17.8 cm.
Subbase (sand) 37.5 cm. 0 cm.
(Source: Road Research Laboratory [16]).
TABLE A3a. VEHICLE CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION
Med. 50 pass- 7 ton 10 ton 22 ton
Car. enger bus truck truck truck
Fuel (1=gas, 2=diesel) 1 2 2 2 2
Horse Power 80 150 178 190 228
Vehicle Speed (km/hr) 96 80 80 80 72
Tare Weight (MT) 0.5 5.0 6.0 10.0 16.0
Vehicle Payload (MT) 0.5 5.0 7.0 10.0 22.0
Number of Axles 2 2 2 2 4
Fraction of Total Load
and Type of Axle
(S=single, T=tandem)
Axle 1 0.5(S) 0.5(S) 0.49(S) 0.4(S) 0.20(S)
Axle 2 0.5(S) 0.5(S) 0.51(S) 0.6(T) 0.20(S)
Axle 3 -- -- -- -- 0.27(T)
Axle 4 -- -- -- -- 0.33(T)
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TABLE A3b. VEHICLE OPERATING DATA SET
Car
Vehicle Cost New (shs)
Financial (F)
Economic (E)
Tire Cost (each)
(F)
(E)
Parts Ratio E/F
Maintenance Labor (F)
(shs/hr) (E)
Utilization (hrs/yr)
(km/yr)
Vehicle Life (yrs)
Interest rate (%) (F)
Driver Wage
(shs/month)
Helper Wage
(shs/month)
Overhead
(shs/yr)
Insurance
(shs/yr)
(E)
(F)
{(E)
(F)
(E)
(F)
(E)
(F)
(E)
20,844
17,349
144
125
7 ton
Bus truck
59,829 36,300
49,760 30,125
900
774
.86
10 10
10 10
375 1,500
19,200 48,000
10 8
12 12
0 0
-- 450
-- 450
-- 250
-- 125
-- 8,539
-- 6,831
490 2,715
392 2,172
Value of Cargo (shs/hr)
800
687
.86 .86
10
10
1,600
64,000
6
12
0
450
450
250
125
8,022
6,418
1,561
1,248
.05
10 ton
truck
84,400
70,400
900
774
.86
10
10
1,600
80,000
8
12
0
600
600
300
150
8,360
6,688
1,928
1 ,542
.05
22 ton
truck
109,824
91,520
1,176
1,014
.86
10
10
1,600
96,000
8
12
0
600
600
300
150
22,939
18,351
1,980
1,584
.05
Petroleum and Oil Costs:
Gas (shs/litre) F
E
Diesel (shs/litre)
F
E
Oil (shs/litre) F
E
1.0
.54
.83
.41
3.11
2.89
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TABLE A4. UNIT MAINTENANCE COSTS
(Tanzania shillings)
Activity Unit Cost
Surface Patching (A/C) sq.m. 4.02
Surface Patching (DBST) sq.m. 2.69
Seal Coating (A/C) sq.m. 2.36
Seal Coating (DBST) sq.m. 2.70
Overlay (A/C) cu.m. 290.00
Overlay (DBST) cu.m. 200.00
Shoulder Grading km. 79.30
Shoulder Resurfacing cu.m. 0.40
Brush Control HECTRE 616.00
Culvert/Ditch Cleaning cu.m. 0.75
(unit costs on asphalt concrete (A/C) roads were obtained
primarily from the SRI report [11], and on Double Bituminous
Surface Treated Roads (DBST), from Lyon Associates [12]).
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TABLE A5. UNIT CONSTRUCTION COSTS
(Tanzania shillings)
Activity Unit Cost
Clearing and Grubbing HECTRE 312.000
Excavation (unclassified) cu.m. 3.294
Pavement Structure
Asphalt Concrete cu.m. 270.745
Crushed Stone Base cu.m. 39.239
Gravel Subbase cu.m. 14.126
Sand Asphalt cu.m. 88.47
Drainage
24" R.C. Pipe Linear m. 137.795
30" R.C. Pipe Linear m. 160.761
36" R.C. Pipe Linear m. 183.727
42" R.C. Pipe Linear m. 321.522
48" R.C. Pipe Linear m. 459.318
(Sources: DCI [13] and SRI [ll1).
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